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The topic of this dissertation is the economic left–right attitudes of people in advanced 
industrialized economies. My overall objective is to examine the extent to which macro-level 
factors – such as state policy, elite opinions, unemployment, and regime type – influence 
these opinions. More specifically, I examine both individual and aggregated economic left–
right attitudes using different sets of survey data in combination with nation-level data. This 
thesis comprises five research articles that shed light on the macro-micro relationship in 
opinion research, where the link between the policies of regimes and the opinions of citizens 
is at center stage. It contributes to the existing literature by investigating the influence of 
country-level characteristics, often in interaction with other factors, on individual-level 
opinions. The analyses presented cover the time period 1985–2007. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to increase our knowledge about the underlying 
determinants of people’s economic left–right attitudes; the focus is to investigate how the 
characteristics of countries affect these opinions. Country-level characteristics are either 
institutional types of welfare policies, the size of government sector, elite views, or economic 
factors related to employment, unemployment, or general economic development. In many 
instances in life, people’s attitudes, consciously or unconsciously, are influenced by those of 
their surroundings. The common denominator for the hypotheses and research questions 
under scrutiny in this thesis is that they seek to see how these macro factors influence public 
opinion toward questions like privatization, individual responsibility, income distribution, 
government intervention, and competition. In short, I test if the public will adjust their beliefs 
to stay in accordance with the values of their society. Papers I and II look at public spending, 
and addresses whether or not there is a link between state policy and attitudes regarding 
government influence, the main hypothesis being: Confidence in institutions will indicate how 
disposed a person is to adjust or react against the economic policies of her regime. In Paper 
III I examine the link between elite and mass opinion investigating the hypothesis: A person 
will adjust his or her opinions to coincide with the perceived temper of the time. Paper IV 
investigates the interplay between country-level unemployment, political position of the 
government, and attitudes about government intervention in the economy, with one of the 
hypotheses being: Public opinion will to shift to the left in times of high unemployment 
combined with a leftist government. In Paper V I test whether welfare regimes tend to 
reproduce their legitimacy in quantitative terms, asking the following research question: Are
there cross-country differences in welfare attitudes depending on regime-characteristics? 
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The main conclusion drawn from the research articles is that there is indeed a link 
between characteristics of countries and individual-level opinions. However, I find that this 
link is conditioned by public responsiveness to these macro factors. Public responsiveness can 
be confidence in institutions or ability for critical thinking, as demonstrated in Papers I, II, 
and III. Paper IV shows that the effect of nation-level unemployment on attitudes is 
conditioned by which political parties are in government. In Paper V it is demonstrated that 
the institutional arrangements of a country can play a part in forming the opinions of its 
citizens. All in all, this thesis contributes to the study of economic left–right opinions and 
finds that country-level characteristics, whether they are government spending, elite views, 
unemployment, or institutional arrangements, do play a part in the formation of peoples 
attitudes. At the individual level, a robust finding is that belonging to the upper socio-
economic strata is associated with holding rightist views on economic questions. 
This doctoral thesis is a contribution to the literature relating to both theory and 
methods. Theory-wise I contribute to the research tradition by employing theories from 
several disciplines in order to derive the hypotheses and research questions posed. Research 
on economic left–right attitudes has traditionally been characterized by the use of theories 
rooted in sociology and political science. This dissertation draws on both of these research 
traditions as seen in the use of critical social theory in Paper III, regime theory in Papers II 
and V, issue ownership theory in Paper IV, and rational choice theory in Papers II and III, as 
well as drawing on the literature of social psychology when employing cognitive dissonance 
theory in Papers I and II, and through the use of the concepts of conformity and identification 
in Paper III. When investigating public opinion, account must be made of political, social, 
economic, psychological, cultural, and historical factors. As a political scientist, I focus on the 
importance of explanatory variables but also maintain it to be valuable to take into account the 
interrelations between different factors. I show that by combining and drawing on different 
theoretical traditions, I can test, supplement, and improve on existing research on macro-level 
factors’ influence on individual level economic attitudes. 
Many studies1 have used the regime theory of Esping-Andersen (1990) as a starting 
point for explaining national variations in economic opinion. No common support for a 
regime effect on individual redistributive attitudes is found. Method-wise, I improve on the 
operationalization and measurement of this country level measure. In Paper II, I argue that 
there are two important reasons for the lack of clear-cut success in efforts in the research field 
                                                 
1 See section “Regime characteristics” for overview. 
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to establish a link between regime characteristics and public opinion towards economic left–
right issues. First, the regime categorization is too broad. In other words, the differences 
within the regime categories are too large to find support for the regime hypothesis when 
investigating individual level opinions. I improve on this by including a new measure – 
namely GOVERNMENT OUTLAY. This variable is related, but not identical to the regime types, 
and is better suited for quantitative analysis. In Paper III, I employ a macro-variable based on 
the party programs of the incumbent. Paper IV investigates national unemployment data. In 
Paper V, I test Esping-Andersen’s regime characteristic on aggregated (national means) 
welfare opinions. The conclusion drawn from Papers II and V is that the regime classification 
is useful, but that the variation in economic opinion from one regime category to another is 
not larger than the in-group variation. 
Second, I argue that previous models have not been correctly specified. My contention 
is that with regards to macro-level factors, conditional effects exist that have been overlooked 
in the literature. This is shown in Papers II, III, IV, and to a certain degree in Paper V. It is 
often the case that a causal claim implies a set of conditions that needs to be satisfied before a 
suggested cause is sufficient to bring about its effect; the magnitude of relationships often 
varies among different categories of people, and is also dependent on context. Thus, the use of 
conditional hypotheses becomes beneficial. These are easily tested in my models by including 
the product of the two variables in question into the regression equation. Let us assume that 
the effect of variable X on Y is dependent on a person’s value on a third variable, Z. The 
regression model for the population would thus be: 
 
 0 1 2 3i i i i i iY X Z X Z eβ β β β= + + + +  
 
where i stands for individual. This equation implies that if X increases by one unit while Z 
remains constant, then Y will change by 1β + 3β . However, my argument in Papers II and III is 
that a macro-level effect is dependent on a person’s value on an individual-level variable. We 
then have what is called cross-level interaction. This term refers to the interaction between 
higher level and lower level variables, and for the population can be expressed: 
 
0 1 2 3 1 0ij j ij j ij ij j ij jY X Z X Z e u Z uβ β β β= + + + + + +  
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where j stands for country and ij means individual i in country j. X is here a country-level 
variable. The use of multilevel analysis enables us to test for macro-level variables’ effect on 
individual opinion, to check for cross-level interactions as well as taking into account that 
people are nested in countries (that the units of analysis are not statistically independent). In 
Paper IV, where there are three nested levels in the data, the effect of one macro-level 
variable is dependent on the value of another macro-level variable: 
 
0 1 2 3 0 0ijk jk jk jk jk ijk jk kY X Z X Z e u vβ β β β= + + + + + +  
 
where j represents country-year and k is country. The interpretation of an interaction effect 
composed of one continuous (X) and one dichotomous variable (Z) is relatively straight 
forward. We can think of two lines for the effect of X, one for each value of Z. This can be 
illustrated in a conditional effect plot. However, when the interaction comprises two 
continuous variables (as is the case in Paper II) the interpretation becomes more difficult to 
comprehend. To assist in this interpretation I have constructed bar charts where I show 
predicted values of Y for different values of both X and Z (see Paper II, pages 313 and 316). 
Paper V looks at the interplay between two macro-level measures and aggregated welfare 
attitudes illustrating this relationship in a graph. My argument here is that regime types can be 
identified by looking at the social expenditure and welfare attitudes of a given country (in 
other words, Y is identified by X given the country’s value on Z).  
Even though conditional hypotheses are commonplace in political science, my 
contribution is to apply these to questions regarding macro factor’s influence on individual 
level opinion (Papers I, II, III, and IV). My argument is that macro-effects are often 
“camouflaged” through interaction effects. Papers II, III, and IV use multilevel modeling to 
address conditional hypotheses. Paper V uses standard OLS regression to test the direct effect 
of regime type on aggregated opinion, as well as looking at the interplay between these two 
variables and social expenditure. By using more quantifiable measures, employing multilevel 
analysis, and modeling interaction effects I am able to assist the reader in a better 
understanding of the link between macro factors and people’s economic left–right attitudes. In 
sum, the use of a multidisciplinary theoretical approach to construct hypotheses and research 
questions and the use of methods that are well suited for testing these, represents a 
contribution to the literature. The common theme and nature of the dependent variables, the 
investigation of macro-factors as independent variables as well as the use of theory and 
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methods described above, binds the five separate papers that constitute this dissertation 
together as a whole.  
Public opinion on economic questions is important in advanced industrialized 
democracies because the people are the ultimate source of power. With this in mind, a 
country’s government should take public opinion into account when deciding which type of 
economic policy to pursue. Thus, public opinion is an important piece of the political 
landscape. It influences a country’s policy through several mechanisms. First, people’s 
opinions are decisive when they cast their votes in elections, where they usually vote for those 
parties or candidates who express a political view with which they agree. Second, they 
influence parties and governments through opinion polls. There are also other ways in which 
citizens can get their views expressed, such as through organizational participation, 
demonstrations, or lobbying. Economic left–right attitudes are thus a part of the basis for 
orientation of a given country’s economic policies. 
However, an individual’s attitudes are also influenced by his or her surroundings. 
When studying public opinion, it is important to be aware of the relationship between macro 
factors and the opinion of the individual. Public attitudes are often rooted in a value structure, 
and this in turn is influenced by national contexts like a country’s institutional organization, 
policy, level of unemployment, or general economic development. There are several ways in 
which these macro variables can exert influence on public opinion: through education and 
socialization, where the individuals are taught to respect the dominant norms and values of 
society; through media, where newspapers, TV, radio, and the internet function as the 
connecting link between elites and members of the public; and directly, for example by an 
increase in purchasing power, or if an individual becomes unemployed. Granted, the features 
of society are also influenced by its citizens. A country’s history shapes its institutions, and 
the people elect the government. However, one sole citizen does not influence his 
surroundings as much as his surroundings influence him. Thus, the main focus of this thesis is 
how features of society influence citizens with regard to economic questions.  
Left and right or liberal and conservative can be called ideological labels. They are 
abstract symbols that can encompass a wide spectrum of perceptions, like general societal 
values, specific societal values, social change values, ways to achieve social change, political 
ideologies, social groups, and political parties (Fuchs & Klingemann 1990). In other words, 
the left–right dimension can have different meanings to different people and is in itself only a 
spatial archetype. This thesis investigates one specific aspect of this scope, namely the 
economic left–right dimension. The importance of this dimension in the total left–right 
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spectrum varies from one country to another. For example, in some countries religious 
cleavages play a substantial part. However, in most countries economic opinions constitute 
the most important decider of where a person stands politically. These are in part a product of 
the labor vs. capital contention, which is one of the basic structures of conflict in a society 
(Lipset & Rokkan 1967). The economic left–right dimension can be divided into three main 
sub-dimensions: (a) state intervention and regulation of the economy; (b) taxes and 
redistribution; and (c) the welfare state. My definition of economic left–right attitudes is as 
follows: leftist opinions are synonymous with pro-collectivism, favorability of state 
responsibility, and support for income equality. Rightist attitudes, on the other hand, consist 
of a preference for individualistic values and income differences, and being negative toward 
government intervention in the economy. I thus investigate values of social inequality, 
government responsibility, and competition. These dimensions constitute what I denote as 
economic left–right attitudes. The same set of opinions is also in the literature sometimes 
defined as welfare attitudes.  
“Public opinion” is a very general term and can be divided into three categories; 
ideals, perceptions, and policy attitudes. Ideals point to the basic values held by the public. In 
other words, ideals represent a lasting idea of what is desirable. Perceptions pertain to a 
person’s view of reality, and attitudes refer to normative judgments of actual situations or 
policy implications (Aalberg 2003: 5f). The dependent variables used in this dissertation can 
be categorized under the perceptions and policy attitudes headings. This thesis finds itself at 
the intersection of several scholarly disciplines. It is a work in political science that borders on 
sociology, makes use of theories from social psychology, and addresses research questions 
that are of interest to economists. My intention is that this doctoral thesis will promote an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of public opinion. There is a gap in the literature 
concerning the macro–micro link regarding people’s attitudes. Granted, some researchers 
have explored individual macro-level variables such as regime type, unemployment, or 
policy. Yet, my contribution is to do this within the confines of a doctoral thesis, with an 
interdisciplinary approach to theories, testing several measures, employing different datasets, 
and introducing new operationalizations and model specifications. By doing this I aim to 
contribute to the literature on comparative public opinion. This dissertation consists of one 
theoretical and four quantitative articles. I make use of multilevel modeling in three of the 
five papers, and in two of these I argue that there is a cross-level interaction effect, that is, that 
the effect of a macro variable on public opinion is dependent on a person’s value on an 
individual-level variable. In addition, for one of the papers the main macro-level effect is 
 7
conditioned by the value of another macro factor. By using multilevel modeling and allowing 
the effects of one variable on another to be differentiated according to the value on a third 
variable, I aim to extend the boundaries of knowledge and contribute with new knowledge to 
the study of public opinion The common theme for all the articles is that there is a link 
between macro factors and individual opinion on economic issues. 
The study of economic opinions can be given a number of motivations. Questions 
about the economy are at the center stage of both the public and the political debate. The 
economic dimension is regarded as the main political bone of contention. Put simply, 
economics is about the distribution of wealth. This is the bottom line of all the analyses 
presented here. State intervention, privatization, individual responsibility, and government 
redistribution of income, all pertain to the same concept: How should the goods (money) in a 
society be distributed? This is a question that is at the center of the debate about what 
principles the governing bodies of a country should adhere to. It is raised from time to time in 
wage negotiations, election campaigns, debates about taxes, and even in questions about war 
and peace. 
Of the five articles (see Table 1 for overview), two present a social psychological 
explanation of the mechanisms that link the size of government outlay to opinions on 
privatization and individual responsibility. The first of these provides the reader with a 
background to Festinger’s (1957) theory, and its application to opinion studies. Briefly, his 
cognitive dissonance theory describes the state of psychological discomfort that arises when 
an individual behaves in a manner that is inconsistent with that person’s beliefs or prior 
actions. In the second paper this same theory is applied to data from the World Values 
Survey. The focus of the third paper is on the relationship between governing parties and 
public opinion on income distribution where data from the European Social Survey is 
analyzed. The theme of the fourth paper is related to that of the third. By employing data from 
the International Social Survey Programme the association between unemployment, 
government, and public demand for government intervention is examined. In the fifth and 
final paper I perform a test of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) regime theory, looking at the link 
between regime types, social expenditure, and welfare attitudes.  
Before presenting the articles I provide the reader with some background and context 
within which to place this thesis. First I give an overview over research on public opinion 
toward economic questions. I then present the methodology and methods that I have applied 
as well as an overview of the data used, before introducing the reader to the five articles that 
constitute my dissertation. 
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This thesis places itself within a growing body of scholarship which studies the economic 
left–right opinions of people. This is a sub-field of electoral research, its main characteristic 
being that one investigates attitudes rather than actual voting behavior. However, opinions are 
decisive for people’s electoral behavior. This is especially true for opinions along the 
economic dimension. Several collaborative cross-national surveys emerged in the 1980s 
allowing researchers to compare attitudes of citizens in different countries. This helped to 
direct the research focus toward macro-level factors and their influence on individual 
attitudes, rather than a sole focus on individual-level explanations. The development and 
improvement of statistical techniques, like multilevel modeling, also rendered possible more 
comparative research on public opinion.   
There is a tradition for research on welfare attitudes, and many have attempted to 
answer the question of what are the determinants of people’s economic left–right opinions. 
One approach is to focus on citizens as rational actors who wish to maximize their utility. 
This argument stems from Downs’ (1957) economic theory of democracy. Persons with a 
high income would thus be expected to hold more rightist views than their poorer 
counterparts. To control for income is a necessity in most studies of public opinion involving 
questions related to redistribution of wealth. Many researchers in this field of study find that 
rational self-interest exerts significant explanatory power on economic attitudes (e.g., Hadler 
2005; Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989; Hayo 2004; Jæger 2006b; Kaltenhaler & Ceccoli 2008; 
Kaltenhaler, Cecooli, & Michta 2006; Larcinese 2007; Linos & West 2003; Lipsmeyer & 
Nordstrom 2003; Mau 2003; Papadakis 1993; Pfeifer 2009) and this is related to the economic 
voting argument proposed by many (e.g., Berelson, Lazarfeld, & McPhee 1954; Duch & 
Stevenson 2006; Goodhart & Bhansali 1970; Martinsson 2009; Orriols 2010; Tibbits 1931; 
Tillman 2008). Both Duch and Stevenson (2006) and Pfeifer (2009) argue that socio-
economic traits impact the vote or opinions depending on national contexts. Kumlin (2004) 
states that self-interest influences a person’s political ideology, with those who gain 
personally from the welfare state being more likely to favor state intervention. However, the 
Downsian argument has been challenged by some. Freire and Lobo (2005), for instance, argue 
that ideology is a more important factor than economics. This argument is supported by van 
Oorschot (2010), who also emphasizes people’s perceptions of the deservingness of welfare 
target groups. Recent findings by Muuri (2010) suggest that in Finland, where there is a large 
support for social welfare services and social security benefits, there is a growing criticism 
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among women, pensioners, and unemployed, who supposedly stand to benefit the most from 
welfare policies. Some of this can be explained by the fact that many elderly and unemployed 
cannot afford the client fees associated with social welfare services, and thus the criticism is 
directed against the performance of the welfare state rather than the welfare principles in 
themselves. 
Education, on the other hand, consists of different components, the most important of 
which is self-interest. Those with higher education are often rewarded both economically and 
with regard to status. We can thus assume that these will hold rightist views on issues 
pertaining to economics or distribution of income. The opposite is also true; those with little 
education are more inclined to choose a leftist stance on the same issues. However, education 
also has another component – the aspect of critical thinking. Critical thinking can lead to a 
reaction and resistance against hegemonic opinions, for example, those prevailing within the 
government party(ies) in a given country. Education may function as a “protection” against 
uncritical acceptance of the dominant viewpoints. Those with higher levels of education are 
assumed to be better trained and equipped to learn and to filter political information than 
those with lower levels of education (Eveland & Scheufele 2000; Liu & Eveland 2005). In 
other words, education will – following the self-interest argument – first and foremost have a 
“right-turn” effect on public opinion. Yet, because of the critical thinking aspect this effect 
should be less prominent in countries whose governments are associated with the political 
right. The effect of education on attitudes toward redistribution is explored in the third paper 
of this thesis. 
 Gender is also an element in the formulation of public opinion. Women are often more 
pro-redistribution of income than men (Aalberg 2003; Kaltenhaler, Ceccoli, & Gellenny 
2008). One reason for this might be that early life experiences of women differ from those of 
men, thereby contributing to a gap between their political values. Women are taught an ethic 
of caring, and are therefore predisposed to think more socially and have less focus on 
individual gain (Jelen, Thomas, & Wilcox 1994; Studlar, McAllister, & Hayes 1998).  
With regard to the influence of age on how the public feels about economic issues 
there is a tendency that the older a person is, the more economically leftist his or her opinions 
will be. This can be explained with the help of Inglehart’s (1977, 1990, 2008) argument that 
the new generations are acquiring more post-materialistic values. Changing upbringing 
environments for the younger generations makes them more concerned with other values than 
earlier generations who grew up under harsher conditions. For these new generations, who 
have had their needs for material safety satisfied during their upbringing, new non-material 
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needs arise. This can function as an explanation for why younger people have more 
individualistic (rightist) attitudes and values than older people who will be more in favor of 
materialistic values such as equality and redistribution of income (leftist attitudes). Inglehart’s 
view is shared by Ester, Halman, and de Moor (1993) who state that as countries advance 
economically, the values of their inhabitants shift in the direction of individualization. One 
could also argue from the self-interest argument, that is, the older population should be more 
likely to support public programs for the elderly. 
  
Regime characteristics  
One branch of research on public opinion has focused on regime characteristics and its 
influence on people’s opinions. Here the welfare state has center stage. All countries must in 
some way provide their citizens with protection against the risks of modern life in order to 
secure continued economic growth and political stability. Thus, the state must play a role in 
promoting the social well-being of the individual. In most countries there is general support 
for and acknowledgement of the positive social consequences of the welfare state, especially 
with regard to the area of health care (Wendt et al. 2010). The importance of the welfare state 
in post-World War II Europe had been underlined by Titmuss (1958) and Myrdal (1960). 
Their works helped to define the pioneering welfare states of the United Kingdom and 
Sweden. Wilensky (1975: 57) argued that the “economic level is the root cause of welfare 
state development,” that is, the level of spending on health and welfare programs increased 
with the level of economic development. In general, the participation of left parties has 
contributed to the development of welfare states (Korpi 1989). Some of the groundwork for 
the regime theory was undertaken by Korpi (1980), who started the task of developing a 
theoretical framework for the comparison of social policies in the industrialized nations. 
 In 1990 Esping-Andersen published his book The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism. Here he categorized welfare regimes according to three types: Liberal, 
Conservative, and Social-Democratic. The countries are grouped according to their level of 
decommodification, social stratification, and employment. Decommodification refers to the 
extent the individual’s welfare is dependent on the market; social stratification pertains to the 
importance of class structures and divisions in society; and employment is concerned with the 
private–public mix. In the Social-Democratic regime citizens experience a high degree of 
decommodification, which is less extensive in the Conservative regime. In the Liberal welfare 
regime the state plays only a marginal role in social policy. Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) 
classification provided a platform for the regime theory branch of public opinion research. 
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Many researchers have drawn new boundaries and added additional regime types, including a 
Southern Mediterranean type. 
 The basis for regime theory in the study of public opinion is that a country has a 
distinctive set of institutions which also implies that there are collective patterns of social 
justice beliefs. Solidarity and social justice principles are rooted in welfare-state institutions 
which shape public discourse and individual attitudes (Hall 1986; Jæger 2006a; Mau 2004; 
Rothstein 1998). In addition, each regime type gives its citizens a personal welfare state 
experience, which in turn influences individual political orientations (Kumlin 2004). This 
implies that there are institutional feedback effects in which, following their creation, the 
regime institutions start to influence the surrounding political landscape. This effect can, for 
example, be seen in national health care. Jordan (2010) finds support for health care to be 
greater in countries with hierarchically organized health care systems than in those where the 
system is decentralized. However, the regime effect is not necessarily uniform across 
countries, as each country has its own history and unique welfare state trajectory. The regime 
hypothesis states that institutional arrangements between the state, markets, and family will 
lead to systematic variations in opinion regarding economic questions (Arts & Gelissen 2001; 
Bean & Papadakis 1998; Blekesaune & Quadagno 2003; Korpi 1980; Linos & West 2003; 
Svallfors 1997). Even before Esping-Andersen’s (1990) book was published, Taylor-Gooby 
(1985) found support for the welfare state in the United Kingdom to be stable and enduring, 
while Smith (1987) highlighted the difference in ideology between countries belonging to 
different welfare systems. Several tests of the regime hypothesis followed in the wake of 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) book (e.g., Andre & Heien 2001; Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Bean & 
Papadakis 1998; Brooks & Manza 2007; Gelissen 2000; Jæger 2006a, 2009; Jordan 2010; 
Larsen 2006, 2008; Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom 2003; Matthews & Erickson 2008; Mehrtens 
2004; Papadakis 1992, 1993; Papadakis & Bean 1993; Svallfors 1997, 2003). There is no 
uniform conclusion made by this literature. Both Bean and Papadakis (1998) and Andre and 
Heien (2001) find between-country differences regarding redistribution and welfare state 
attitudes. Mehrents (2004) shows a noticeable ideological rift depending on regime type, 
though Sweden and the United Kingdom are anomalous cases that differ from their respective 
regimes. This is confirmed by a comparison of attitudes in Sweden and the U.K., which 
reveals no signs of strong leftism in the Swedish population compared to the British 
population (Svallfors 1993). Larsen (2006, 2008) argues that regime characteristics influence 
attitudes, and that regime values tend to reproduce themselves. This claim is supported in a 
comparison of the USA and Norway undertaken by Edlund (1999). Brooks and Manza (2007) 
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follow in a similar vein, arguing that mass opinion is a consequence of social policy-making. 
Prolonged left-wing incumbency often means higher levels of social spending and contributes 
to opinion formation by generating support for the existing welfare arrangements (Jensen 
2010).  
 However, others find more mixed results when testing the regime hypothesis. 
Svallfors (2003) states that in-group variations are as large as between-group variations. Arts 
and Gelissen (2001) argue that values of solidarity and justice are matters of priority to all 
welfare states. Jæger (2006a, 2009) finds mixed support for the relationship between welfare 
regimes and support for redistribution. Others find little or no attitudinal differences between 
the regime types (e.g., Gelissen 2000; Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom 2003). According to 
Papadakis (1993) there is a bivariate relationship between regime and attitudes, but this is not 
robust when other factors are included in the analysis. Some argue that it is the political 
principles reflected in national constitutions that matter for attitudes toward welfare policies 
(Iida & Matsubayashi 2010). All in all, the literature gives no unambiguous conclusion to 
whether or not there is a regime effect on public opinion toward redistribution or welfare 
provision. This question is addressed in Papers II and V.  
  
Country differences in economic left–right attitudes 
One early study is that of Free and Cantril (1968), who analyzed Gallup poll data, 
categorizing the opinions of Americans according to their support for social and economic 
welfare programs, and for Federal intervention into state and personal matters. They found 
most Americans to be “Operational Liberals,” but also discovered that about half could be 
labeled “Ideological Conservatives.” With the increasing availability of survey data, several 
studies emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Coughlin (1980) presented a variety of survey data 
on public attitudes toward welfare policies for eight Western industrialized countries. He 
found support for social-policy principles to be most favorable in Sweden, while being 
weakest in the USA. Judge, Smith, and Taylor-Gooby (1983) investigated public opinion in 
the United Kingdom, discovering that the pro-privatization social policy of the Thatcher 
government is supported by the public, but that this finding coexists with public enthusiasm 
for state welfare. 
 Concerning Eastern Europe, Hayo (1997) presents evidence that people in Hungary 
and Poland are satisfied with the speed of transformation to a market economy compared to 
Czechs and Slovaks. However, Listhaug and Aalberg (1999) show that egalitarian values are 
persistent in the former communist nations of Eastern Europe. Public support for the creation 
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of a market economy in Eastern Europe is smaller for the poor, elderly, female, and less-
educated people living in rural areas (Hayo 2004). Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003) find 
opinions on welfare responsibility to be generally European rather than Eastern or Western. 
However, post-communist countries in Europe have a greater desire for funding welfare 
spending than do their western counterparts (Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom 2003). In their 
examination of attitudes toward state intervention in Germany, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 
(2007) found East Germans to be more pro-state than West Germans. This is due in large part 
to the direct effect of communism. A similar study performed by Svallfors (2010) show that 
while there are differences between the two regions of Germany, over time there is a 
convergence of attitudes as those of the East approach those of the West.  
In a study of the Nordic countries Listhaug (1990) finds no support for the claim that 
leftism is dominant in the views of the public. He argues that the failing support for leftism is 
partly caused by the achievements of egalitarian politics because the Nordic countries have 
already achieved many of the egalitarian goals, and thus people’s appetite for more of the 
same has been satisfied. This argument is supported by Pfeifer (2009). Aalberg (2003) finds 
that the citizens of Sweden and Norway show quite strong support for egalitarian principles, 
while Americans are at the other end of the scale. The Scandinavian countries do not stand out 
at either end of the scale when it comes to opinions about means like taxation and regulations. 
Empirical evidence from Sweden suggests that there is no link between distrust in the 
institutionally capacity of the welfare state and anti-welfare state sentiments (Edlund 2006). 
At the political level there is a relatively high degree of stability in partisan support for 
welfare state expansion and investments in social justice in the Nordic countries, while 
market-type solutions to social problems have become more salient, especially for parties 
belonging to the political right (Nygård 2006).  
Concerning unemployment as a factor determining attitudes, Fraile and Ferrer (2005) 
investigate public support for cuts in unemployment benefits in OECD countries. They find 
both the generosity of unemployment protection and the seriousness of the unemployment 
problem in a given country to play a part in forming opinions. Citizens living in Social-
Democratic or Conservative welfare regimes show a lower propensity to accept 
unemployment protection retrenchment compared to those who live in Liberal regimes. In 
addition, people living in countries where the unemployment rate is high show a lower 
disposition to accepting cuts in unemployment protection spending than those living in 
countries where the level of unemployment is low. An earlier study by Blekesaune and 
Quadagno (2003) shows that an increase in unemployment at the national level leads to an 
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increase in support for the welfare of the unemployed. Blekesaune’s (2007) study confirms 
this finding. There is also a connection at the individual level. Temporary employment and 
part-time employment increases an individual’s subjective economic insecurity (Burgoon & 
Dekker 2010). If a person is exposed to risks in the labor market he will tend to demand 
redistribution (Rehm 2009), which is similar to the finding that increased financial strain is 
associated with stronger support for state responsibility for economic provision (Blekesaune 
2007). 
 Another relevant question is the following “to what degree does inequality in a society 
foster opinions for reduction in the same inequalities?” Kaltenhaler, Ceccoli, and Gelleny 
(2008) state that what people think about income inequality in their society is largely a 
product of their underlying ideas about politics and society rather than an expression of self-
interest. Finseraas (2009) state that country-level inequality is positively associated with 
demand for redistribution, a result to a large degree driven by persons with high incomes. This 
finding stands in opposition to those made by Moene and Wallerstein (2001), Larcinese 
(2007), and Lübker (2007). The former state that greater inequality increases support for 
welfare benefits to the employed, but decreases support for benefits to those without earnings. 
The latter two claim that an increase in income inequality does not increase political demand 
for redistribution. This stance is also supported by Kenworthy and McCall (2008). Jæger 
(2008) demonstrates that the left–right orientation has a causal effect on support for 
redistribution. In the West, acceptance of inequality is interwoven with right-wing orientation 
(Thorisdottir et al. 2007). 
 One factor that can influence people’s attitudes toward the welfare state is 
immigration. There is a weak negative effect between the perceived presence of immigrants 
and native population support for the welfare state. However, this weak mean effect differs 
substantially from country to country (Senik, Stichnoth, & Van der Straeten 2008). There is 
also evidence that hostility toward immigrants reduces the preferred level of redistribution, a 
finding that is to a large degree at play in Social-Democratic countries. However, believing 
that immigration reduces average wages or takes jobs away from the indigenous population is 
positively related to preference for redistribution, especially in the Conservative regime 
category (Finseraas 2008). In addition, national identification is associated with reduced 
support for income equalization (Shayo 2009). 
Some studies are similar to my thesis, in that they consider what I would call cross-
level interactions – that is, where there is an interaction between a variable at the individual 
level and the national context, as is done by Senik et al. (2008) (mentioned above). Linos and 
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West (2003) fall into the same category as they identify cross-national differences in different 
factors’ influence on the social bases of support for redistribution. The difference between 
married and unmarried people is small in Social-Democratic countries; the insider/outsider 
cleavage2 is decisive in Conservative countries; while class matters in Liberal regimes. 
Contrarily, in a study of attitudes toward welfare policies among different classes in Sweden, 
Germany, United Kingdom, and the USA, Svallfors (2004) finds that class differences are 
most pronounced in Sweden. Also Busemeyer, Goerres, and Weschle (2003) state that 
national characteristics matter with regard to the impact of age and income on attitudes 
toward welfare state policies. 
In summary, the literature shows that there are differences between countries with 
regard to economic left–right opinions. Where there are differences between countries, there 
are also macro factors at play. Some studies have explored the possibility that the effect of 
one individual-level variable may depend on the national context. This is related to what I do 
in Paper III when investigating the effect of education which differs according to the views 
expressed by the political elites. I also argue that the effect of a variable at the national level 
depends on people’s values on an individual-level variable (Papers I & II), and also that two 
national context variables interact, as seen in Paper IV. Thematically, Paper V fits into the 
ongoing regime debate, as does Paper II. Paper IV investigates unemployment as an 
explanatory factor, thus following up the thread from Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), and 
Blekesaune (2007), and in addition bringing the concept of issue ownership into the equation. 
 
The present thesis 
In this dissertation I take a closer look at some of the macro–micro connections with regard to 
public opinion on economic questions. Campbell et al. (1960) presented their “funnel of 
causality.” They use a funnel as a metaphor to present those factors which influence voting 
behavior. The axis of the funnel consists of the time dimension and variables influencing a 
person are presented as a chain of causation that ends up in the stem of the funnel. Figure 1 is 
inspired by Campbell et al.’s metaphor. In my variant of this “funnel of causality” we look at 
how people’s economic attitudes are formed. We find the individual-level factors closest to 
the opinion-forming process (represented by the large arrow). My main point with this 
doctoral thesis is to investigate those factors that lie behind the individual-level causes, 
namely macro-level factors. I seek to give a better understanding of the factors situated at the 
                                                 
2 Insiders are those who enjoy stable and protected employment. 
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mouth of the funnel and explain how these influence individual-level opinion. That is, macro 
factors which directly, or through interaction with variables situated closer to the narrow end, 
influence public opinion on economic left–right questions. My goal is to analyze and describe 
how these variables that are at the nation-level can influence people’s attitudes toward 
economic questions. Some of these factors have a direct influence, while others influence by 
way of interacting with another variable (as we can see from the dotted lines in the funnel).  
   
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The attitudes under scrutiny here are prone to change, even in a relatively short time period 
(as opposed to ideals, which are assumed to be relatively stable). These attitudes can also 
manifest themselves in voting behavior. Of course, electoral results are more prone to swings 
than people’s attitudes and perceptions, as is shown in Figure 2. This figure shows the 
election results for political parties that are considered to be to the right on the economic 
political spectrum in countries belonging to the Liberal (U.K.), Conservative (Germany), and 
Social-Democratic (Norway) regime types. We see from the figure that for Norway and the
United Kingdom there was a rise in these parties’ popularity in the 1980s, which coincides 
with the popularity of New Public Management reforms, a time period which saw the 
renaissance of the market in the western industrialized countries. Noteworthy from the figure 
is that the line for Germany falls after the German unification, and the 1993 election in 
Norway was influenced by the upcoming referendum about EU membership. The 2000s see a 
rise in these parties’ electoral support juxtaposed with the low point of the 1990s. 
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Note: United Kingdom is represented by the votes for the Conservative Party. The line for Germany defines the 
votes for the CDU/CPU collapsed with the votes for FDP. Norway includes the Conservative Party and the 
Progressive Party (formerly known as ALP). 
 
#	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In this dissertation I make use of statistical methods. According to King, Keohane, and Verba 
(1994: 8), the goal of scientific research is to make conclusions that go beyond the collected 
data. With large-N studies it is possible to make generalizations about the causal effects of 
different phenomena (if one has established the direction of causality). However, this 
presupposes the availability of data, whether the data consists of a sample of a population or, 
the whole – or bordering on the whole – population, as would often be the case when using 
states as the units of analysis. The approach used in this thesis is called inferential statistics. 
This may be used for predictions and hypothesis testing and is now commonplace in the 
studies of public opinion. 
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As a tool of the positivist tradition,3 inferential statistics is a way of identifying 
patterns and regularities in the observable world. Statistics involve the systematic collection 
of data with the aim of achieving knowledge by induction, that is, making inferences from 
observed regularities to general theories. This systematic inductive use of statistics can be 
traced back to John Graunt, Sir William Petty, and Hermann Conring (Moses & Knutsen 
2007: 71f). In the 17th century they brought the use of descriptive statistics to science. The 
least-squares method was introduced by Carl Friedrich Gauss at the turn of the 18th century. 
Yet, the phrasing of social science questions in variable terms did not occur until the 19th 
century. Francis Galton introduced the correlation coefficient, the scatter plot, and also 
regression analysis, the prime tool of modern social science statistics (Moses & Knutsen 
2007: 76ff). Karl Pearson carried on Galton’s work, and later Émile Durkheim placed 
statistics in the center, finding covariance between suicide and religion, in addition to other 
variables. Before Durkheim introduced the use of statistics into the social sciences, 
researchers relied on a more philosophical procedure, based on reasoning and facts of 
experience (Ellwood 1931). This can be illustrated by an event that took place in Norway in 
the 17th century.  
In 1612 a following of more than 300 mercenaries left Aberdeen in Scotland and 
sailed across the sea, eventually reaching the coast of Norway. Their plan was to cross the 
Norwegian interior in order to join their Swedish employers in the Kalmar War.4 The 
Scotsmen went through Romsdalen, and after a while they reached the valley of 
Gudbrandsdalen, located in the heart of the Norwegian inland. When the entourage had 
reached the narrowest part of the valley, they discovered an unaccompanied, but armed, 
Norwegian farmer. The Scottish mercenaries, led by their Captain George Sinclair, pursued 
this lone peasant. Suddenly the peasant was out of sight. All the Scotsmen could see was a 
secluded linden tree. There was no place there to hide, except for in the tree. The Norwegian 
could not have reached the sides of the valley without being noticed. The only logical 
explanation was that the farmer was covering himself in-between the branches of the linden. 
Thus, Captain Sinclair concluded that the peasant had climbed up and was hiding in the tree.  
 The conclusion made by Sinclair was, of course, a valid scientific inference. This is 
because the Scotsmen’s background experience assumed that the farmer had no other means 
                                                 
3 The positivist tradition holds that the world consists of regularities and that everything can – at least in 
principle – be demarked, described, measured, compared, explained, and used to make predictions (Moses & 
Knutsen 2007: 29; Sohlberg & Sohlberg 2001: 39). 
4 The Kalmar War (1611–1613) was fought between Sweden and Denmark. The root of the war was the Swedish 
wish to establish a trade route through northern Norway (Norway was then a part of the Danish kingdom).  
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of escape than to climb up the linden, taking into account that, as far as the mercenaries knew, 
no man could fly or disappear into the ground. In the same manner as Captain Sinclair 
reached this conclusion, the great thinkers of all sciences have reached their conclusions. One 
has a background experience which one uses as a basis when interpreting the facts. All in all, 
science involves a large degree of systematized common sense.  
 Yet, in today’s social science tradition many researchers would not have accepted 
Sinclair’s conclusion. They would have demanded further evidence, preferably with 95 
percent certainty. Today’s quantitative researcher would likely have insisted that Sinclair’s 
men had thrusted pointy sticks or spears through at least 19/20 of the linden, to ensure that 
one with enough statistical significance could conclude whether the frightened peasant 
actually was hiding in the tree. One would not have trusted the Captain’s experience and 
common sense alone, one now wants numbers and facts on the table before deciding whether 
or not the Norseman is hiding in the linden or not. 
 Well, Captain Sinclair was of course right in his conclusion, even though this was not 
based on numbers or tests of significance. Yet, this was of little help, as about 500 Norwegian 
farmers came down from above the path, ambushing the mercenaries. The whole incident 
ended with the defeat of the Scottish troops, the death of George Sinclair, and the tragic fate 
of the surviving Scotsmen in a barn in the deep interior of Norway. Still, this is not what is 
important with this story. The main point is that the social sciences need to be receptive to all 
facts, and also to all methods in which one can discover facts that can be useful for 
understanding social or macro-level processes. 
In this thesis I make use of sampling theory, generalizing my findings from the sample 
to the population. I am also undertaking analyses employing countries as the units of analysis. 
For this purpose I employ stochastic model theory. When one follows sampling theory one 
should get perfect prediction when investigating the whole population. Yet, when following 
stochastic model theory we are generalizing from the observation made, to the process or 
mechanism that brings about the actual data (Aaberge & Laake 1984: 165; Gold 1969: 44; 
Henkel 1976; 85f). We begin with a nondeterministic experiment, which implies that the 
results of the experiment will vary, even if we try to keep the conditions surrounding it 
constant. This enables us to make sense of the use of confidence intervals and significance, 
even if we are looking at the entire population.5 If there is a lack of statistical significance, 
                                                 
5 “In using stochastic models, we consider the collected data being generated from a stochastic experiment. 
Then, the probability model is specified by the probability of the possible outcomes of the experiment. Such a 
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then it is an indication that the association produced by nature is no more probable than that 
produced by chance (Gold 1969: 44). 
Using statistical methods, social scientists are able to make generalizations about the 
empirical world, whether operating with samples of a population, or the population as a 
whole. There are many pitfalls to avoid before making statistical generalizations. One must 
define the population correctly, taking into account what the sample should constitute, and 
which time period to investigate. The researcher needs to be aware of the context and 
disposition of their data, which are the assumption that underlie statistical models (John 
2002). Sampling error is not the only source of error encountered in survey data. Other 
problems include interviewer variability, non-response, problems connected to the 
questionnaire etc. (Groves 1989). Cross-cultural comparability is of importance for my 
dissertation, as it deals with comparative research on attitudes. In doing this kind of research 
one assumes that the questions posed in the surveys have the same implication in the different 
countries.  
It is commonplace to operate with p-values, which denote the probability of being 
mistaken when we reject a null hypothesis (which proposes that there is no relationship 
between two measured phenomena). The closer a p-value is to 0; the more certain we can be 
of not rejecting a true null hypothesis when accepting our own alternative hypothesis. Even 
so, one also needs the backing of sound theory to say something about the relationship 
between variables. Statistical correlations should not be mistaken as being causal 
explanations. As such, observed relations must be interpreted with basis in theories about 
human action (Bay 2000; Elster 1989, 1998). The results from a regression analysis 
essentially only provide us with correlations between variables, just as Hume (1740) tells us 
that we can only observe patterns and regularities, not causality. Hume emphatically states 
that science needs to be careful with regards to causal claims:  
 
I assert it to be the very same with that betwixt the ideas of cause and effects and to be 
an essential part in all our reasonings from that relation. We have no other notion of 
cause and effect, but that of certain objects, which have been always conjoined 
together, and which in all past instances have been found inseparable. We cannot 
penetrate into the reason of the conjunction the objects acquire an [sic] union in the 
imagination (Hume 1740: Book I, Part III, Section VI). 
                                                                                                                                                        
formulation allows us to generalize from the data to the mechanism that generates the data” (Aaberge & Laake 
1984: 185). Henkel (1976: 86) refers to this mechanism an “unspecified random process.” 
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Although I agree with the positivist assumption that there exist patterns in nature 
which may be observed, I also acknowledge the argument that the proxies of what I am 
measuring are not optimal. Since I do not have direct access to what I am measuring (public 
opinion), I must rely on survey questions that are vulnerable to many types of measurement 
errors. The statistical method is suitable for making generalizations that go beyond the 
collected data, and can thus assist the researcher in identifying patterns and regularities in the 
observable world. However, there are caveats connected to this choice of method. One of the 
most pronounced problems is that regression analysis only provides us with correlations 
between variables. Statistical methods exist that can determine causality, but these are not 
easily applicable and they often presuppose longitudinal data. Therefore, one needs the 
backing of sound theory to say something about the causal relationships between the 
variables. When it comes to assessing causal relationships the experimental method is 
considered the best option available for scientists. This method allows the researcher to 
manipulate the environment in which causal relationships are tested, thus reassuring us that 
the relationships discovered are real and not a result of contextual influence (Moses & 
Knutsen 2007: 53). In the present thesis I make use of theories based on the experimental 
method. 
This study is concerned with providing a deeper understanding of public opinion 
toward economic left–right issues by employing statistical methods, presenting descriptive 
statistics, and estimating regression models. Public opinion is a wide notion that includes 
ideals, perceptions, and policy attitudes. This dissertation focuses on cross-level effects, 
investigating how policies, the economy, norms, and values of a country influence the public, 
regardless of whether the country embraces individual or collective values. I argue that 
country-level factors hold explanatory power over individual-level opinion.  
 
Multilevel modeling 
Multilevel analysis has been a core analytical technique in this thesis. Since my main 
argument is that variables observed at the state level influence variables at the individual 
level, the use of multilevel analysis, or hierarchical models, is beneficial. Such models involve 
data that are ordered hierarchically, that is, some units of analysis are considered a subset of 
other units. In the case of this dissertation, individual respondents are a subset of countries. 
The object of a multilevel analysis is to account for variance in a dependent variable measured 
at the lowest level, by investigating information from all levels of analysis (Steenbergen & 
Jones 2002: 219). There are both theoretical and statistical reasons for using this approach. 
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From a theoretical point of view I am concerned with the relationship between the individual 
and society. I argue that a person is influenced by the features of his or her society. 
Observations that are close in space are likely to be more similar than observations far apart. 
Thus, respondents from the same country share more similarities with each other than they do 
with respondents from different countries, due, among other things, to shared history, 
experiences, and environment.  
This implies a statistical reason for using multilevel modeling. Such a shared context 
is a cause of dependency among observations. This intra-country correlation changes the error 
variance of ordinary least squares regression models, which represents the effect of the 
omitted variables plus the measurement errors, assuming that these errors are unrelated (Kreft 
& de Leeuw 1998: 9). If the individual-level dependent variable is influenced by country-
level variables, the observations at the lowest level are not independent, that is, they are 
clustered. If one violates the assumption that errors are independent, this will cause the 
estimated standard errors to be too low, and the t-statistics to be too high (Steenbergen & 
Jones 2002: 220). Hox (2002: 3) also warns against the danger of interpreting aggregated data 
at the individual level. In addition, multilevel modeling is an answer to the criticism that 
proponents of the qualitative method often raise against statistical research – more 
specifically, account has to be made of the context of the individuals when studying these. 
This is actually one of the advantages of multilevel analysis. By including nation-level factors 
in the regression equation one allows for the context surrounding the individuals to be 
accounted for. 
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Here I present a summary of data sources used. One of the hallmarks of this dissertation is the 
combination of survey and country-level data. Two of the papers (Papers II and V) use data 
from the World Values Survey (WVS). WVS is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural 
and political change, the latest survey covering more than 60 countries. The survey is funded 
locally through scientific-funding bodies in each participating country. Its history spans back 
to 1981, when its predecessor, the European Values Survey, was extended so as to include 
countries outside Europe. The chairman of the WVS Executive Committee is Ronald 
Inglehart from the University of Michigan. WVS gathers data from personal interviews of 
representative samples of the populations in the different countries. It focuses on individuals’ 
values and attitudes on important areas of life, including family, religion, moral, work, and 
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politics. The undertaking of a given WVS survey is called a wave. A total of five waves or 
rounds of the WVS have been carried out. After the first survey there was an interval of 10 
years, and further waves came at intervals of approximately five years. This thesis employs 
data from the last four waves of the World Values Survey (1989–1993, 1994–1999, 1999–
2004, and 2005–2007).6  
 Paper III employs data from the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2004 (ESS 
Round 2; Jowel et al. 2005). This survey has several similarities to the WVS. However, it 
only encompasses European countries. The ESS is funded through the European Commission, 
the European Science Foundation, and scientific national funding bodies in each country. The 
project is led by Roger Jowell at the Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University, 
London. It is a biennial multi-country survey designed to chart and explain the interaction 
between Europe’s changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior patterns of its 
countries’ populations. The data collection is based on personal interviews in more than 30 
nations. Like the WVS, the ESS is a repeat cross-sectional study. A total of four surveys have 
been performed, the first fieldwork commenced in 2002.  
 The International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) study “Role of Government” is 
used for the analysis in Paper IV. The ISSP is an annual cross-national survey program on 
topics that vary from year to year. It now includes more than 40 countries in its survey. We7 
use the “Role of Government Module,” which was performed in 1985, 1990, 1996, and 2006. 
The aim of this module is to assess citizens’ opinions on the functions of their national 
governments – what governments should and should not be doing. It is divided into four 
topics: civil liberties, government and the family, government and social inequality, and 
economic intervention. It is the latter topic we have used in our article. The data used in Paper 
IV are distributed by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. ISSP and NSD are not 
responsible for the analysis of the interpretation of data presented in this thesis. 
 In addition to survey data, I have also made use of country-level variables in this 
doctoral thesis. Paper II uses data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD 2005) on government outlays. The data are the actual general 
government outlay in percent of nominal GDP. In Papers II and III I use data from the Human 
Development Index (HDI) which are based on the Human Development Report. An index 
used to rank countries according to their development, the HDI is made up from GDP per 
                                                 
6 The data sets used in this dissertation are made available through the Norwegian Social Science Data Service 
(NSD). Neither Ronald Inglehart, WVS, nor NSD are responsible for the analyses or interpretations made in this 
thesis. 
7 Paper IV is co-written with Ola Listhaug. 
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capita, life expectancy, and education. The report is published by the United Nations 
Development Programme (2010). Paper III also employs data from the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) for its main explanatory 
variable. This dataset uses political texts to provide estimates of party positions, voter 
preferences, and government policy from election programs collected systematically from 
more than 50 countries. The Manifesto Research Group was formed in 1979 by Ian Budge 
and David Robertson at the University of Essex. Their work resulted in the manifesto data 
that measure party policy positions in each election as stated in the party programs. In Paper 
IV we use data on unemployment taken from the Key Indicators of the Labour Market 
Database from the International Labour Organization (2009). The same paper uses a variable 
denoting whether a country has a government that is situated to the left of the political 
spectrum. We have made our own assessment of what constitutes the left side of politics in 
each country (for details, see the appendix of Paper IV). Lastly, Paper V employs Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) regime classification of industrialized countries as the main country level 
measure. In addition, I also use data relating to gross social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP, obtained from the OECD (2008). The OECD Social Expenditure Database provides 
data on trends and composition of social expenditure within the different OECD countries. 
 
#"" 	 	""
The present thesis investigates the relation between macro-level factors and people’s 
economic opinions controlled for and sometimes in interaction with individual characteristics. 
Public opinion is an important part of the political landscape. It influences the politics that are 
executed through several mechanisms. First and foremost, the opinion of the electorate as 
expressed through the ballot box, is decisive. Further, public opinion influences the parties 
and the government through opinion polls. People can also use other methods to get their 
views made known to decision-makers, such as organizational activities, demonstrations, or 
through lobbying. As the papers show, macro-level factors do influence public opinion on 
economic left–right issues, often through interaction with other variables. In addition, socio-
economic characteristics are strong predictors of left–right attitudes.  
 
Paper I: The Conditional Adjustment Hypothesis: Two Ways of Dealing with Dissonance
The first paper of this dissertation is a book chapter which is published in Sofia K. Ogden and 
Ashley D. Biebers’ (eds.) Psychology of Denial. Here I present the theory behind the 
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conditional adjustment hypothesis. In brief, the hypothesis states that confidence in 
institutions will indicate how disposed a person is to adjust to or react against the economic 
policies of his or her regime. It is derived from Listhaug and Aalberg’s (1999) adjustment
hypothesis in combination with Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance. I use the 
chapter to present the social psychology theory of cognitive dissonance and look at how this 
can be applied to the study of public opinion. Both political science in general and the study 
of public opinion in particular, are known for adopting theories from other research traditions. 
Festinger’s theory has achieved great popularity in many fields of study, and has previously 
been employed in research on public opinion and voting behavior by, among others, Osgood 
(1960), Morwitz and Pluzinski (1996), and Anderson, Mendes, and Tverdova (2004). The 
theory of cognitive dissonance outlines how a psychological state of discomfort can be solved 
when one experiences inconsistency of having conflicting thoughts. When this dissonance 
appears, a person will try to reduce it by employing one out of two strategies: (a) the 
cognition of one’s own behavior may be changed through a change in actions; or (b) through 
acquiring a new understanding of what is proper behavior.  
The main message of this paper is that it is essential not to rely on statistical analyses 
alone, but one must also have a strong theoretical reasoning at hand. I argue that the use of 
Festinger’s theory strengthens the causal claims of statistical analyses since it is based on the 
experimental design, which the positivist tradition ranks as ideal with regard to making causal 
claims. This paper gives a presentation and elaboration of the theories employed in the second 
paper, which is an empirical test of the conditional adjustment hypothesis. 
 
Paper II: Public versus Private: The Conditional Effect of State Policy and Institutional 
Trust on Mass Opinion 
In the second paper, which is published in the European Sociological Review, I apply data 
from 25 OECD countries taken from the World Values Survey. I investigate how the size of 
government spending, quantified as total government outlay, together with people’s level of 
trust in institutions influence attitudes towards privatization and individual responsibility. 
Public spending is a relevant factor when investigating these sorts of opinion. If we follow 
Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, a person will feel a psychological state of 
discomfort when experiencing the inconsistency or dissonance of having conflicting thoughts. 
A person’s attitudes are therefore likely to change following the psychological stress caused 
by inconsistency between that person’s opinions and the policy carried out in the country of 
residence. The person concerned will then try to reduce this dissonance to achieve consonance 
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with regards to his opinions. There are, as mentioned, two ways to achieve consonance. The 
first option is that the person alters his attitudes so they are in line with those values that are 
prevalent in his country. However, there is an alternative way to achieve consonance. The 
person who experiences dissonance can also change his “knowledge” (Festinger 1957, p. 6). 
In other words, if that person’s attitudes are in conflict with the prevailing norms and 
viewpoints, than he could look for other ideals than those of his country to get support for his 
own stance. If, for example, a person who resides in a social-democratic country is in favor of 
privatization, then that individual will experience psychological uneasiness. He will then, as 
already indicated in the paragraph on Paper I, have two options: (a) to adjust his attitudes and 
become less favorable towards privatization; or (b) to look for other sources of inspiration 
than his own country, such as a more liberal regime like for example the USA. Choosing 
option (b) is far from impossible in today’s globalized and technologically advanced world as 
one has easy access to foreign media and information from other countries. 
 The important question is who chooses solution (a) and who chooses (b). The 
argument in Papers I and II is that trust in institutions is the decisive factor. More precisely, 
trust in regime- and opinion-forming institutions that are separate from the parliament and the 
executive. A person with a great deal of trust in institutions is more likely to accept his 
country’s prevailing values. This way an American citizen with trust in American institutions 
will also have trust in his country’s political and historical heritage. This implies that he is 
more receptive to his country’s politics, which in the case of the USA means relatively little 
government interference in the economy and relatively large emphasis on individual 
responsibility. On the contrary, an American who lacks confidence in institutions, and thus 
also lacks trust in “the American way,” will to a smaller degree be influenced by his country’s 
politics. However, this person will still experience psychological stress considering that his 
opinions are at odds with those of his surroundings. To accommodate this stress he is 
expected to choose option (b), which implies finding other sources for inspiration if he does 
not share the American ideals. An example of such a person is the film-producer Michael 
Moore, who is dissatisfied with at least parts of the American ideals, and thus looks to other 
countries for inspiration, such as Canada or the United Kingdom. 
 In a country with a large public sector, an individual with a high level of trust in the 
country’s institutions will be more negative towards privatization and individual 
responsibility than a person with a lower level of trust. For a country with a large private 
sector, the effect will be the opposite: strong trust in institutions will imply a more positive 
attitude towards market forces and personal responsibility. From this line of argument we get 
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the conditional adjustment hypothesis. The results from Paper II show that there is no direct 
effect of the size of the public sector on people’s attitudes towards privatization and 
individual responsibility. The reason for this is that the conditional adjustment hypothesis 
possesses explanatory power; trust in institutions implies that a person holds leftist opinions 
in countries with a large public sector, while the opposite is true for countries with a small 
public sector. Thus, the effect of the size of the public sector is differentiated according to a 
person’s level of trust. 
 
Paper III: Education and the Zeitgeist: Government Positions and Public Opinion on 
Income Distribution 
Paper III is published in the European Political Science Review and looks at the effect of the 
political elite on public opinion towards redistribution. Here I investigate 23 countries, 
combining data from the European Social Survey and the Comparative Manifesto Project. The 
latter data set provides a measure of government policy positions on economic left–right 
issues, consisting of statements in the party program of governing parties about their positions 
on free enterprise, economic orthodoxy, market regulation, economic planning, privatization, 
and state control over the economy. This measure functions as a proxy for political elite 
opinions to which the public is exposed to through the media and other channels of 
information. Three hypotheses are tested. The first hypothesis concerns the direct influence of 
the political elite on mass opinion. A country’s political elite are in an advantageous position 
when it comes to opinion formation, since they comprise both lawmakers and the executive 
power. In addition, the elite views can be perceived as being the dominating views in a 
society. People’s perception of support for a certain way of thinking can lead them to “jump 
on the bandwagon.” I find covariance between the views of the elite and the public. However, 
this effect is not robust when controlling for whether or not the individual voted for the 
government. If a person voted for one of the ruling parties, then he often shares the same 
opinions as those expressed in that party’s program. But this is not the same as saying that 
those people are influenced by the parties, because the causal direction goes both ways (i.e., 
people vote for those parties which reflect their viewpoints). 
 The second hypothesis tests the self-interest argument, and it is shown that people 
belonging to the upper socio-economic strata (operationalized through income and education) 
on average hold more rightist views on income redistribution than the rest of the population. 
Likewise, those with low income or little education are generally more in favor of 
redistribution. This is because people tend to support solutions that are in their economic 
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interest. The third and final hypothesis tests whether or not there is a cross-level interaction 
between elite opinion and education. The argument here is that education consists of different 
components, the most important of which is self-interest. However, there is also another 
component – critical thinking. Habermas (1968) argued that self-reflective knowledge reduces 
a person’s dependence on accepting the truth as told by the established elites. In other words, 
one goes from being a “socialized team player” to becoming an “unbiased observer” 
(Habermas 1968: 237). Critical thinking can lead to a reaction against and opposition to 
hegemonic values, for example those expressed by the governing party(ies) of a given 
country. Education functions as a “protection” against uncritical acceptance of the dominating 
views. Those with higher education are assumed to be better equipped to filter political 
information than those with basic education. In sum, education will first and foremost have a 
rightist effect (more opposition toward redistribution) on people’s opinions. However, due to 
the critical thinking aspect, this effect will be less pronounced in countries with a rightist 
government. The data render support for this argument: the rightist tendency for persons with 
higher education is significantly lower if their government is economically conservative. 
 
Paper IV: Issue Ownership, Unemployment and Support for Government Intervention 
I have written the fourth paper together with Ola Listhaug, and it is forthcoming in Work, 
Employment and Society. The statistical analysis and the main part of the writing have been 
done by me. Listhaug has contributed to the introduction, theory, discussion, and conclusion. 
Here we examine the relationship between unemployment and public demand for government 
intervention in the economy. Work is one of the cornerstones of people’s lives, and to be 
employed is important for one’s financial situation. The importance of a job is especially 
prominent in troubled times, such as in the wake of the recent financial crisis. In a study of 
people’s attitudes towards welfare politics, Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) find that an 
increase in unemployment at the national level leads to more support for welfare benefits for 
the unemployed. Blekesaune (2007) reaches the same conclusion. He argues that in times of 
economic downturn, people want the state to take more responsibility. Similar findings are 
presented by van Oorschot (2006).  
 We use data from the International Social Survey Programme – that is, the “Role of 
Government” survey – and investigate 23 OECD countries. Our dependent variables are three 
questions about government intervention in the economy and spending on unemployment 
benefits. The results show that a person’s support for government intervention rises if he 
experiences personal unemployment. However, the effect of aggregate unemployment was 
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found to be conditioned by what type of party is in government. Even in times of economic 
depression, a government situated to the left may be perceived to be more competent with 
regards to economic questions than their right- or center oriented counterparts. According to 
the clientele hypothesis, a government situated to the left on the political scale will not be 
punished even though it cannot solve the unemployment problem. The underlying logic of 
this hypothesis is that the electorate assumes that the incumbents are better suited to handling 
unemployment than the opposition. This is called issue ownership. 
 Transferred to the study of public opinion, one may assume that people’s economic 
attitudes will make a shift to the left in times of high unemployment combined with a leftist 
government. This is associated with the fact that in times of economic hardship, 
unemployment will rise to the top of the political agenda, and on this issue parties to the left 
have issue ownership. If these same parties are in government, they will use this position to 
push economic issues onto the political agenda, thus further influencing people’s opinions. If 
a leftist party is in office, it will have better control over the channels of communication. Our 
findings suggest that there is an issue ownership effect. High unemployment combined with a 
leftist government leads the citizens to be more in favor of government intervention in the 
economy. There is no significant effect of unemployment on people’s attitudes if the 
government is centrist or rightist.  
 
Paper V: Welfare Attitudes and Social Expenditure: Do Regimes Shape Public Opinion? 
My doctoral thesis concludes with the fifth paper, which examines the link between regime 
types, social expenditure, and welfare attitudes. It is published in Social Indicators Research. 
This paper has Esping-Andersen’s (1990) regime typology as its point of departure. As 
already mentioned, his classification divides the countries into Liberal, Conservative, and 
Social-Democratic categories. In addition to Esping-Andersen’s three regime types I also 
include an Eastern European and an Asian category in my analysis. I use data for 19 OECD 
countries taken from the World Values Survey for my country-level analysis, and I examine 
two research questions. The first investigates the direct influence of regime type on attitudes 
regarding income equality, government responsibility, and whether or not competition is 
harmful – this I denote as welfare attitudes. I found that the countries that belong to the 
Liberal regime category generally hold more rightist views than those belonging to the 
Conservative regimes, while the Social-Democratic countries are located in-between these 
two. The attitudes of people in Eastern European, and Asian countries did not differ 
significantly from those characterized as Liberal or Conservative regime types. This finding is 
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explained by the tendency for Liberal countries to favor private solutions for social risks, 
while the Conservative regime type places less emphasis on individual values and instead 
emphasize the importance of the church, family, and workplace. 
 The second research question asks whether we are able to trace the contours of the 
different regime types by investigating the social expenditure and welfare attitudes of the 
OECD countries in this study. Social expenditure is an important instrument of welfare state 
redistribution, and it can be argued that as well as with public attitudes, this expenditure is 
determined by the institutional arrangement (regime type) of the state. Results show that by 
plotting countries according to their aggregated welfare attitudes and social spending, we can 
observe the contour of three of the welfare regimes, namely the Liberal, Conservative, and 
Social-Democratic. The Eastern European countries, however, do not group together in the 
graph. Previous efforts to test the regime hypothesis on public attitudes have proven less 
fruitful. My contribution with this fifth paper is a simple, yet nuanced view of the regime 
classification, by simply looking at the interplay between social expenditure and welfare 
attitudes. 

+"
This dissertation gives a systematic and extensive comparative investigation of attitudes along 
the economic left–right dimension. Its main contribution is, as already mentioned, to explain 
the link between macro factors and public opinion, using theories from several research areas 
and disciplines. It looks at the interplay between different factors, and emphasizes the 
importance of individual-level variables such as trust in institutions and education. In the 
present thesis I argue that macro-level factors do influence micro-level attitudes, but in some 
cases these effects are disguised as the effects differ depending on an individual’s value on 
another variable. The sum of my five papers represents a contribution to the advancement of 
knowledge in public opinion research as it casts new light on the macro–micro link when it 
comes to opinion studies. In this study I have discovered some of the underlying causes of 
people’s opinions about questions concerning private ownership, competition, individual 
responsibility, redistribution, government intervention in the economy, government 
responsibility, and income equality. My argument is that both characteristics of the society 
and the individual are decisive of people’s response to these questions. I firmly believe that 
this dissertation represents a useful contribution to the academic literature on economic left–
right opinions. There is a gap in the literature with regards to the systematic study of the 
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macro–micro linkage. In this respect, my theoretical reasoning and analyses presented in the 
five papers is of value. 
 To end up this introduction I will summarize the main conclusions from the five 
papers included herein. The common denominator of the articles is the theme of the 
dependent variables, as well as the presence of country-level explanatory variables. All the 
articles investigate and explain what the determinants of economic left–right opinions are. In 
Papers I and II I argue that these are influenced by the size of the government sector and use 
experimentally-based social psychological theory to show how this effect is dependent on 
people’s trust in institutions. Paper III looks at the effect of government policy statements and 
education – and concludes that there is little direct elite influence, although self interest and 
critical thinking plays a major role. In Paper IV it is shown that there is a combined effect of 
unemployment at the nation level and the economic policies of the government. Paper V 
argues that there is a link between regime type, social expenditure, and economic opinions. 
Future research should include comparisons of public attitudes in different countries, 
as well as more focused research on individual opinions. Questions that might be raised are 
whether or not we can observe a Europeanization of opinions, or whether there are still 
substantial cross-national differences. There is room for both quantitative (comparisons of 
different countries) and qualitative (going deeper into the causes of economic attitudes on a 
single country) studies, as well as for experimental studies (in order to be better able to make 
causal claims). One could also, for example, undertake a case study of how the public reacts 
to a local privatization project, studying opinions both before and after the undertaking. It 
could also be interesting to follow time trends of changes in mass opinion. In addition, 
emphasis should be placed on the importance of carrying out comparative surveys, such as 
those which have been advantageous to this dissertation. 



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1Education and the Zeitgeist: 
Government Positions and Public Opinion on Income 
Distribution 
Tor Georg Jakobsen 
Abstract 
Despite a sizeable literature on the elite mass linkage, few of these studies are cross-national. 
In this paper I apply multilevel ordered logit models to investigate public opinion toward 
redistribution in 23 European countries. I test whether these views depend on: (1) the policies 
of the government (i.e., the bandwagon effect) and (2) personal interest, as indicated by 
income and education. Briefly, the bandwagon effect appears when people’s perception of 
strong support for one line of thinking leads to their adopting this reasoning. The self-interest 
argument states that those who would benefit from a redistributive policy are likely to support 
it. In addition, I argue that higher education has a dual nature, consisting of an interest in 
providing one’s own self-interest as well as a critical thinking component. Elite opinion is 
quantified from the party manifestos of incumbent parties and tested against data from the 
European Social Survey. I find no significant direct effect of political elite views on public 
opinion. On the other hand there is strong support for the self-interest argument, yet the 
rightist tendency for higher educated persons is significantly smaller if their government is 
economically conservative. This finding is attributed to the critical thinking argument as well 
as to the reasoning that higher education makes people better able to filter political 
information, thus countering the bandwagon effect. 
Keywords: public opinion • income distribution • education • critical theory • multilevel  
2Introduction 
The French people have opted for change … I shall be implementing this change 
because this is the mandate I have received from the people and because France needs 
it.1
The above were the words of then president elect Nicolas Sarkozy in his victory speech in a 
Paris concert hall. Sarkozy’s passage is illustrative of the first question under scrutiny in this 
paper: is public opinion influenced by the temper of the times? Many studies have 
investigated the link between elite and mass opinion. Yet few cross-national studies explore 
this proposed connection. This article focuses on the influence of government and political 
leadership, measured through the party manifestos of governing parties, on public opinion 
toward income distribution. By investigating individuals in 23 European countries my aim is 
to shed some light on the comparative element: do the political elites of different countries 
influence their citizens to adopt their own opinions? A given government, despite belonging 
to a certain spectrum of the political landscape, can also play a unifying role. This 
impersonation may function as a guiding star for the attitudes of some of its citizens. For 
example, in 1997, after 18 years in opposition, the “New” Labour Party won the election in 
Britain. In his speech outside Downing Street Prime Minister Tony Blair made the following 
remark: “Above all, we have secured a mandate to bring this nation together, to unite us – one 
Britain.”2
Political elites are in a particularly important position considering that they consist of 
lawmakers and the executive. In addition, elite views can be perceived as the prevailing 
opinion of a given society, thus leading people to hold similar beliefs. A simple bivariate 
model with elite opinion plotted against countries’ mean values on attitude toward 
redistribution shows some support for this bandwagon effect, indicating that there is indeed a 
link between the opinions of the political elite and those of the public. Yet, when employing a 
multilevel ordered logit model controlling for other factors, this apparent effect proves to be 
spurious. This is due primarily to the introduction of a control for whether or not a respondent 
voted for one of the ruling parties. My starting point is that the governing parties’ policy 
toward income distribution at time t influences the views of individuals at a later time. 
However, I acknowledge that the views individuals hold toward income distribution may have 
1 BBC News (2007), ‘Nicolas Sarkozy: Victory speech excerpts,’ May 6: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6631125.stm 
2 Prime Minister’s Office (1997). Speech outside Downing Street 2 May 1997. 
3been instrumental when electing the governing party, hence raising the question of causal 
inference. I circumvent this by regressing individual views at time t on the policy stated in the 
party programs of the preceding election. Party policies toward economic questions are also 
known to be relatively stable over time. 
 In addition to testing for a direct bandwagon effect, two more hypotheses are also 
examined in this paper. Firstly, there is firm support for the self-interest argument: that is, 
persons belonging to the upper socio-economic strata are found to hold more rightist opinions 
on wealth distribution. The third hypothesis is more intriguing. Based on critical theory, I 
argue that highly educated persons tend to react against elite values. This hypothesis is tested 
by a cross-level interaction term, and the results support this proposed relationship. Education 
is shown to have contradictory effects. On the one hand, it can strengthen opposition to 
income redistribution because education increases one’s income. On the other hand, it can 
also lead to a reduction in a person’s dependence on “accepted truths,” hence spurring a 
reaction against elite values. 
The elite–public link 
The dependent variable of this study is an ordinal question about whether or not the 
government should reduce differences in income level. Attitudes toward income inequality 
are an important dimension of people’s left–right political orientations, linking it to the main 
cleavage in party politics. The left–right continuum has often been given economic meaning. 
In this respect, income inequality, as opposed to equality, is a measure of economic 
conservatism. Capitalism deepens the divide between the rich and the poor. Thus, economic 
conservatism indicates acquiesce to economic inequality (Thorisdottir et al., 2007, p. 179).   
There are several schools of thought concerning the analysis of democracy and elitism, 
or the opinion–policy relationship. For simplicity, these competing theories can be classified 
in two main schools (Petry, 1999). First, the democratic responsiveness model is based on 
Dahl’s (1967) pluralist conception of the formation of mass opinion. This faction sees public 
opinion as an independent force capable of directly or indirectly influencing political 
decisions. The public’s influence is channeled through several policy linkages, such as 
political parties, interest groups, and the courts. This model thus predicts that there will be 
consistency between public opinion and the policies implemented in a society. Followers of 
the democratic responsiveness school include Page and Shapiro (1983), Brettschneider 
(1996), and Monroe (1998). The other main approach to explaining the opinion–policy 
relationship is the democratic frustration model. Researchers in this school hold a more elitist 
4view, contending that ruling elites play a greater part in policy decisions. The democratic 
frustration school is followed by scholars such as Lindblom (1977) who sees market 
mechanisms and authority structures as instruments of social coordination and control. In 
those cases where mass opinion differs from that of the ruling elite, the elite view will prevail, 
thereby leading to predictions of inconsistency between opinion and policy (Brooks, 1985). 
Followers of this direction in opinion-research include Rose (1967), Lindblom (1977), 
Manley (1983), and Brooks (1985, 1990).  
 Simply put, I follow the latter line of argument. My a priori assumption is that mass 
opinion reflects the dominant values of the ruling elite because of its influence on opinion 
formation and also due to socialization (Brooks, 1990, p. 513). Dahl (1982) admits that given 
the sheer size of government, the average citizen is not capable of exerting much influence 
over it. According to Zaller (1992), individuals establish their views based on political 
information. This information is to a large extent determined by political elites, and is made 
available through mass media, which is considered to be the primary source of popular 
information about political issues. There exists a rich literature on how to make causal 
inferences about the relationship between media coverage and knowledge. This includes 
observational studies, laboratory experiments with simulated media coverage, and studies 
with media content that make between-subject comparisons.3 Barabas and Jerit (2009) state 
that policy-specific information can influence the degree to which people emphasize certain 
social and political issues. Ginsberg (1986) argues that elites have the resources necessary to 
control public opinion. More recent research has found a relationship between political 
discussion and political knowledge, though some evidence suggests that this is channeled 
through information-processing behaviors (Eveland, 2004). Following this line of reasoning, 
the starting point of the present article is that the government and political leadership may 
influence public opinion.
The Zeitgeist of an era? 
Public opinion research is described as “a mode of interpreting and expressing the soul of a 
people, the temper of the times, the Zeitgeist of an era” (Alpert, 1956: 494). In many instances 
in life, people, consciously or unconsciously, follow societal norms. As a result of 
psychological pressure, and in order to reduce social anxiety, a person will behave in a certain 
way. If the surroundings follow one set of behavior, the individual in question internalizes this 
3 Please see Barabas and Jerit (2009) for an overview of this research. 
5and takes this set of actions for granted (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 1984). 
Socialization and interaction contribute to internalizing norms and values. Formal and 
informal sanctions attached to some types of behavior lead us to behave in a certain way, 
often in accordance with what the majority perceive to be correct.  The concepts of conformity
and identification also apply to political opinion. People have an ability to perceive what the 
majority think, leading them to remain silent rather than express divergent views and thereby 
risk sanctions such as social isolation. Yet, one does not only alter one’s actions or opinions to 
avoid sanctions, but also to achieve positive feedback. This, together with what Noelle-
Neumann (1984) calls the “spiral of silence,” contribute to making the dominant public 
opinion a Zeitgeist powerful enough to form a general public opinion.  
 This novel argumentation draws on the literature of social psychology. One can 
separate public conformity without private acceptance and public conformity with private 
acceptance. The first – compliance – represents an aspect of social conformity, and occurs 
when an individual accepts influences because he hopes to gain some sort of reward or to 
avoid punishment. The latter is deeper, and forces an individual to re-evaluate his or her 
opinions. This identification implies that the individual adopts what he or she perceives to be 
the prevailing opinion, confirming the opinion both publicly and privately (Kelman, 1958). 
This line of argumentation is related to the adjustment hypothesis, which states that members 
of the public will adjust their beliefs to stay in accordance with the values of their society 
(Listhaug and Aalberg, 1999; Aalberg, 2003), as well as to Stimson’s (1991) argument that 
mass opinion can be identified as policy moods. One might even use the term bandwagon 
effect – that is, that the perception of strong support for one line of thinking may lead a person 
to “jump on the bandwagon.” There are examples of countries where a wish to adjust to 
perceived public values influences personal opinions toward redistribution (Corneo and 
Grüner, 2002). In a recent study, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) find different 
preferences for redistribution among East Germans and West Germans, the former being more 
in favor of redistribution and state intervention. They hold this to result largely from exposure 
to Communism. However, over time there is a convergence in attitudes, where Eastern 
Germany becomes more similar to Western Germany (Svallfors, 2010). Some research on the 
bandwagon effect exists in the election studies literature. An analysis of exit polls in Britain 
between 1979 and 1987 shows some support for the notion that voters will favor a party that 
has been doing well in opinion polls (McAllister and Studlar, 1991). Yet others argue for 
another driving force, namely the underdog effect. Butler (1996), however, states that 
6evidence for both phenomena is vague and inconclusive, and that no systematic pattern can be 
detected. 
To summarize the literature review, the options on the table in the context of this paper 
are: (a) there may be a direct effect where government (majority) opinion leads the public to 
identify with the values of the political elite, namely an identification effect; (b) there is a 
compliance effect – that is, the public still cling to their private values yet desist from 
displaying them in public; and (c) there is neither an identification nor a compliance effect. 
From this reasoning I deduct the following hypotheses: 
H1a: There is no effect of incumbent party preferences on public opinion toward 
redistribution.
H1b: A person will adjust his or her opinions to coincide with the perceived temper of 
the time.
Hypothesis H1b is thus a test of the bandwagon (Zeitgeist) effect. If supported, this would 
suggest that we are dealing with an identification effect – that is, the public incorporates and 
adopts surrounding values (option a). If rejected, the effect is not direct. One explanation in 
the latter case could be that the “spirit of the times” only leads to compliance; an alternative 
explanation is that there is simply no identification or compliance effect (alternatives b and c). 
In the case of options b and c, the null hypothesis (H1a) will not be rejected. 
Education: self interest versus critical thinking 
The self-interest argument states that those who would benefit from a rightist redistributive 
policy are likely to support it. People belonging to the upper socio-economic strata can be 
expected to hold rightist views on economic questions, since individuals will generally opt for 
solutions that best promote his or her own self-interest (Downs, 1957). This is confirmed in 
several empirical studies (e.g., Edlund, 1999; Svallfors, 2004; Jæger, 2006; Konrad and 
Spadaro, 2006). The best proxy for the self-interest argument is income. Following this line of 
thinking, those with high income would quite naturally be more negative toward income 
redistribution. 
Konrad and Spadaro (2006) explore the empirical relationship between perceptions 
about personal abilities and attitudes to income distribution. Their findings suggest that 
education and wealth play a part, with the poor and uneducated asking for more redistribution. 
7Education, I hold, consists of several constituent components, the most important being self-
interest. Since more highly educated people are often rewarded in both monetary and status 
terms, this group can be assumed to harbor rightist views. The opposite is also true: less 
highly educated individuals are likely to prefer redistributive policies. Yet, there is another 
factor associated with education, namely critical thinking. Habermas (1968) presented his 
critical social theory as a form of self-reflective knowledge, which reduces a person’s 
dependence on accepting the truth as told by the established elites. In other words, turning 
from a sozialiserte Mitspieler into an unparteiische Beobachter, and thus understanding that: 
“[w]irklich ist, was unter den Interpretationen einer geltenden Symbolik erfahren werden” 
(Habermas, 1968, p. 237). This reasoning has since gained a foothold in education theory (see 
Giroux, 1983a,b). Critical thinking may lead to reaction and resistance against hegemonic 
opinions, for example, those proclaimed by incumbent political parties. It has been found to 
mediate state effects of schooling on political attitudes (Fairbrother, 2003), as well as having a 
direct effect regarding moral economic issues (Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Fallan, 1999). In his 
critical theory, Habermas highlighted the growth of the mass media, which pacifies the 
general public, making it more prone to elite influence. Education might serve as “protection” 
against uncritical acceptance of dominating views. Those with higher levels of education are 
assumed to be better trained and equipped to learn and filter political information than those 
with less education (Eveland and Scheufele, 2000; Liu and Eveland, 2005).  
This is illustrated in figure 1. The minus sign indicates that people are likely to react 
against the dominant policy through the critical thinking mechanism. The self-interest part of 
education is expected to carry more weight than the critical thinking part. Thus, from the self-
interest argument I deduct the following hypothesis: 
H2: A person belonging to the upper socio-economic strata holds rightist views on income 
redistribution. 
In other words, I expect both income and education to be positively associated with 
conservative economic opinions. Even so, I still reckon the critical thinking argument to yield 
some explanatory power, which can be tested using multilevel models. This effect is expected
to be present when examining the conditional effect of education and the specific economic 
policy-statements of a given country. In line with Downs (1957) a highly-educated person
8Figure 1. The two components of education 
Note: This figure shows the reactionary effect of policy on education, represented by the minus sign. The self 
interest effect is expected to outweigh the effect of critical thinking. 
would be assumed to hold rightist opinions regardless of national policy-statements. But, as is 
deduced from critical social theory, this rightist effect would be less pronounced in countries 
where the dominant political opinion is against redistribution, as the critical thinking 
component comes into play. This is also illustrated in figure 1: there is a reactionary effect of 
policy on education, which is decisive for redistribution opinions. If the hegemonic opinions 
are rightist, then critical thinking will lead a person to hold more leftist attitudes. Thus, a new 
hypothesis emerges: 
H3: The rightist effect of education on economic left–right opinions is smaller in 
countries where the political elites are negative towards redistributive policies. 
Processes other than self interest and critical thinking can be argued to be at work here. 
Education has a general liberalizing effect, yet this is most noteworthy when investigating 
other dimensions of the left–right continuum, like social tolerance and nationalism. In 
addition, the cognitive mobilization thesis assumes that party attachments are used as a 
solution for under-informed persons who wish to cast a ballot with minimal cognitive effort. 
Education as well as the mass media contribute to increased knowledge among the citizens, 
thus leading to fewer votes being cast for the same party across elections. This is achieved 
through the cognitive mobilization of the voters (Dalton, 2007). However, a recent finding by 
Albright (2009) suggests that cognitive mobilization actually increases the probability that a 
person shows attachment to a specific party. 
9Party programs as a measure of government policy 
This analysis will investigate whether there is covariance between party programs and 
people’s economic left–right opinions. For my country-level explanatory variable – 
ECONOMY – I rely on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001; 
Klingemann et al., 2006). I use a measure of government policy positions on economic left–
right issues consisting of statements made about party positions on free enterprise, economic 
orthodoxy, control of the economy, market regulation, economic planning, privatization, and 
state control over the economy. I have created an additive index from these statements (as 
advised by Finseraas, 2010).4 This index functions as a proxy for the elite opinions the public 
is exposed to through media and other information channels. Weights are applied based on the 
proportion of parliamentary seats held by each party in a government.5 Taking into account 
that the form and interpretation of party programs differ from country to country, and in order 
to reduce undue influence from outliers, I have chosen to log-transform this variable. 
The basis of the country-level measure is the election programs of the governing 
parties of each country studied. These programs are representative statements for the whole 
party, and their coding can be regarded as complementary rather than overlapping with other 
methods for determining party positions, like expert surveys (McDonald et al., 2007; 
Volkens, 2007). One strength of the manifesto approach is its capacity to identify changes in 
different parties’ competitive strategies, whereas expert surveys  have a tendency to place 
most parties at given left–right positions over time (Volkens, 2007, p. 109). The Comparative 
Manifesto Project data is regarded as a reliable source of comparative data on party positions, 
and have accordingly been employed in several recent studies (e.g., Koch, 2007; Manow et
al., 2008; Finseraas, 2010; Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009) as well as in tests of its validity 
and reliability (e.g., Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; McDonald et al., 2007; Netjes and 
Binnema, 2007; Volkens 2007). Yet, even though variables drawn from these data are 
regarded as valid and plausible, one must take into account that different measures of party 
positions are not directly interchangeable (Ray, 2007). 
It is important to stress that elite thinking is not equivalent to the election programs of 
governing parties. The political parties are influenced by political context, the nature of the 
constitution, and also by opinion polls. Schmidt (2002) highlights governments’ ability to 
gain agreement for their view through political discourse, which is understood as both a set of 
ideas and an interactive process. Whether or not people respond to the political elite depends 
4 For a listing of the statements included in the measure, see Appendix A. 
5 As advised by Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2006). 
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on the success of the legitimating discourses. Also, more consensual polities might tend to 
generate manifesto policies that are directed at constructing support across a range of groups 
and parties, while majoritarian polities, such as the United Kingdom, may tend to have more 
simple class splits in manifesto statements. Nevertheless, party manifestos are a useful and 
quantifiable measure which can be used to test the hypotheses presented in this article. 
One obvious drawback of using Manifesto Data to construct an explanatory variable is 
that of endogeneity. Economic opinions influence votes, and to a large degree this is separate 
from partisan bias (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). It can, with good reason, be argued that people’s 
attitudes on income distribution affect party programs through two principal mechanisms. 
Firstly, voters elect the government, and secondly, the political elite use opinion polls to test 
public opinion on important issues. Contrary to this, recent research shows that political 
parties do not easily adapt to popular wishes or real-world impulses (Walgrave and 
Nuytemans, 2009). Even so, I have taken two precautionary measures to avoid or minimize 
the endogeneity problem (in addition to my theoretical argument linking elite-influence to 
public opinion). Temporality is essential for making causal inferences. This analysis includes 
the introduction of a time lag on the main explanatory variable. The Manifesto data are from 
the party programs of the election prior to the survey (which was conducted in 2004). The 
year of the previous election differs from country to country. In addition, I include a control 
for whether or not a person voted for one of the parties in government in the previous 
election. The data employed are hierarchically nested, and I include a random slope 
coefficient for this control, allowing the effect to vary from country to country. I present an 
additional model replacing the random slope coefficient with an interaction term composed of 
VOTED GOVERNMENT and lnECONOMY. This, together with the time lag, helps control for the 
part of the dependent variable that would explain the Comparative Manifesto data. The 
VOTED GOVERNMENT variable functions as a moderator, that is a “variable that affects the 
direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a 
dependent or criterion variable” (Baron and Kenny, 1986, p. 1174).  
Data and variables 
The analysis presented here is based on the second round of the European Social Survey 
(ESS), containing individual-level data from 2004 (Jowell et al., 2005).6 There are 23 
countries and 30,683 individuals included in the study. The dependent variable in this paper is 
6 The data are provided by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). 
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a five-point ordinal scale pertaining to individual opinion on income distribution. The 
respondents in the ESS survey were asked to comment on the following statement: 
“Government should reduce differences in income levels” with the reply categories ranging 
from “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly.” Thus, high values on the dependent variable 
indicate rightist economic opinions. The individuals in the survey are nested in countries. To 
test the hypotheses presented here, I therefore rely on multilevel modeling. This choice of 
method allows me to model outcomes as a function of independent variables at both the 
individual and country levels.7
 The first theoretically important individual-level variable is SCALE OF INCOMES (1–
12). This is the main measure of the self-interest argument from which the second hypothesis 
is drawn. HIGHER EDUCATION is a dummy variable denoting whether or not the respondent 
has attended at least the first stage of tertiary education.8 In addition, five control variables are 
included in the analysis. Gender is operationalized through the dummy variable WOMAN.
Women are expected to be more favorable to income distribution than men (Aalberg, 2003). 
Inglehart (1990) argues that post-materialism leads to more individualistic values, that is, 
younger people should hold more rightist redistribution values than members of the older 
generation. I employ AGE to control for generational effects, along with a squared age term to 
capture any nonlinear relationships with the dependent variable (AGE SQUARED).9
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST (0–30), LIFE SATISFACTION (0–20), POLITICAL INTEREST (0–1), and 
VOTED GOVERNMENT (0–1) are also included to provide a good model fit.10 The effects of the 
latter two variables are allowed to vary from country to country.  
I have also included two country-level measures. The first – the natural logarithm of 
the economy measure described in the section about party programs – is in effect a measure of 
the political elite (see Table 1 for values). As a control measure for country level variation I 
use the Human Development Index (HDI) for 2003. This is a composite variable made up of 
three constituent parts: GDP per capita; life expectancy; and education (UNDP, 2005). I have 
also tested the models by including a nation level control for the extent of inequality in each 
country (the GINI index). The effect of this variable was not statistically significant. I also 
found no significant difference between former communist states and other countries with 
regard to their score on the dependent variable.
7 Country-level characteristics account for around 10 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. 
8 The results from the models are robust according to other coding schemes of the education variable. 
9 The results for the other variables do not change significantly when running the models without age squared. 
10 INSTITUTIONAL TRUST and LIFE SATISFACTION are aggregated measures. For factor loadings and a measure of 
reliability, see Appendix E. Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis are found in Appendix 
D.
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Table 1. Government positions on the economic left–right dimension, high values indicate 
rightist positions 
 ECONOMY lnECONOMY Income Distrib.
Denmark        12.72 2.93 2.31 
Slovakia  6.03 2.49 2.30 
Switzerland  5.18 2.41 3.01 
Portugal  4.76 2.38 2.18 
Estonia  4.31 2.33 1.99 
Norway  4.18 2.32 2.34 
Sweden  4.03 2.31 2.58 
Iceland  2.85 2.18 2.42 
Spain  2.83 2.18 1.79 
Netherlands  2.69 2.16 2.02 
Austria  1.47 2.01 1.56 
Hungary  1.02 1.95 1.82 
Slovenia  0.46 1.87 2.60 
Germany -0.59 1.69 2.25 
Greece -0.95 1.62 2.40 
Luxembourg -1.08 1.59 2.35 
Ukraine -2.31 1.31 2.24 
Ireland -2.36 1.29 2.01 
Czech Rep. -3.42 0.95 1.68 
Finland -3.57 0.89 2.92 
France -3.91 0.74 2.10 
Belgium -4.96 0.04 1.80 
Poland -5.00 0.00 2.18 
Mean 1.06 1.72 2.17 
Note: Taking into account that the form and interpretation of party programs differs from country to country, I 
have chosen to log-transform the ECONOMY variable to reduce undue influence from outliers. Since one cannot 
use log transformation when there are values on the variable that are equal to or below zero, I have added the 
score 6 to all units before log-transforming the variable. 
Results 
The first hypothesis deals with the direct link between party manifestos and mass opinion 
toward redistribution. In figure 2 the governments’ economic left–right positions are plotted 
against the mean values on INCOME DISTRIBUTION for each country in the analysis. We see 
from the figure that there is a positive linear tendency, though not a very steep one. Thus, the 
more economically rightist the incumbent party (parties) of a country is (are), the more 
negative toward redistribution is its population. With regard to the third hypothesis, figure 3 
shows the same link, with the mean values for persons with and without higher education 
respectively. When looking at the two sub-groups, we see no co-variation between the party 
manifestos and the redistributive opinions of those with higher education. On the other hand, 
the positive linear trend is stronger for less educated respondents. The bivariate relation 
between party manifestos and redistributive values seemingly supports the first hypothesis, 
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Figure 2. The effect of rightist government on attitudes toward redistribution, mean values for 
countries 
Figure 3. The effect of rightist government on attitudes toward redistribution, categorized 
into respondents with high education, and without high education, mean values for countries 
at least with regard to persons without higher education. As expected, higher educated persons 
are on average closer to the conservative end of the left–right spectrum. Still, this is a very 
crude comparison of country means, without controls for other relevant factors. To combine 
information at the micro level (respondents) and macro level (countries), we need to apply 
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multilevel models. The models include the important control for whether or not the 
respondent voted for the incumbent parties, namely the VOTED GOVERNMENT variable. This 
article aims to identify predictors of opinion toward redistribution. Since I am employing an 
ordered logit model, the dependent variable can be described as: 
[a]    
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2._ _____________________ _
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Note: y = observed ordinal response, y* = underlying left–right opinion, and  = cut-off points that divide y* 
into ordinal categories. 
I present three models in this paper. The first tests the direct link between party manifestos 
and public opinion toward redistribution. The second and third models investigate the 
suggested twofold nature of education on redistributive opinions: 
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Using these model specifications means that the signs of the coefficients presented are turned 
to obtain the natural interpretation.11 In the first and second equations the regression 
coefficients for POLITICAL INTEREST and VOTED GOVERNMENT are allowed to vary among 
11 The models are calculated using MLwiN, version 2.10. 
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the countries. The second equation comprises a cross-level interaction term (HIGHER 
EDUCATION*lnECONOMY) to test the third hypothesis. In the third equation there is in addition 
a cross-level interaction term consisting of VOTED GOVERNMENT and lnECONOMY, which 
implies that the effect of having voted for the incumbents varies according to the left–right 
positions of the country to which the individual belongs. VOTED GOVERNMENT is therefore 
not a random effect variable in equation three. 
 Before viewing the main regression models, we must remember the nature of the main 
explanatory variable, lnECONOMY. As already mentioned, this is a proxy for the hypothesized 
influence of the political elite on mass opinion. Party manifestos, however, are based on the 
wordings of the parties in government, and are not necessarily representative of the politics of 
the country in question. What one says and what one does can clearly be two different things. 
This can be illustrated in a simple correlation matrix, presented in table 2.  
Table 2. Correlation matrix for ECONOMy, LnECONOMY, and GOVERNMENT OUTLAY 
 Economy LnEconomy 
lnEconomy 0.921 - 
Gov. Outlay 0.210 0.076
Note: Pairwise correlations. Estonia, Slovenia, Switzerland, and 
Ukraine are missing from the GOVERNMENT OUTLAY variable. 
 We see that lnECONOMY (where high values indicate rightist views) is actually 
positively correlated with the size of the government sector as proxied by total government 
outlay (OECD, 2005). One additional explanation for this apparent mismatch is that it takes 
time to increase or decrease the size of the public sector. In this paper I argue that what 
politicians state may influence public opinion regardless of their actual policies. 
 The three models of this analysis are presented in table 3. I have also performed a 
sensitivity analysis (see Appendix B), using a linear model. The results from the ordered logit 
model and the sensitivity model do not differ substantially. From model 1 we see that after 
including controls for other factors, there is no significant effect of political elites’ left–right 
views on mass opinion toward redistribution. Thus, one cannot reject H1a, even though the 
sign is positive. So, after controlling for VOTED GOVERNMENT and other relevant independent 
variables, we find that there is no significant effect of incumbent party preferences on public 
opinion toward redistribution. There is no direct influence of government (or majority) 
opinion that leads the public to identify with the values of the political elite, and the 
bandwagon effect is not supported when investigating party manifesto data. 
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Table 3. Ordered logit model with attitude toward INCOME DISTRIBUTION as dependent 
(1) (2) (3) 
b Std. E. b Std. E. b Std. E. 
Level-1 variables         
Woman -0.261*** 0.022 -0.262*** 0.022 -0.261*** 0.022 
Age -0.032*** 0.003 -0.031*** 0.003 -0.032*** 0.003 
Age squared 0.0002*** 0.000 0.0002*** 0.000 0.0003*** 0.000 
Scale of incomes  0.102*** 0.001  0.101*** 0.006  0.104*** 0.006 
Higher education  0.382*** 0.028  0.682*** 0.066  0.677*** 0.066 
Life satisfaction  0.046*** 0.003  0.045*** 0.003  0.045*** 0.003 
Institutional trust  0.023*** 0.002  0.023*** 0.002  0.023*** 0.002 
Political interest  -0.034 0.028 -0.033 0.028 -0.030 0.025 
Voted Government  0.232** 0.106  0.233** 0.106 -0.321*** 0.059 
      
Cross-level interaction       
High Edu.*Economy   -0.173*** 0.035 -0.165*** 0.035 
Vot. Gov.*Economy      0.304*** 0.031 
      
Level-2 variables       
lnEconomy  0.105 0.136  0.109 0.136  0.106 0.140 
HDI 2003 -4.304* 2.222 -4.320* 2.227 -4.051* 2.296 
      
Cut points            
 1 -4.115 2.010 -4.122 2.015 -3.867 2.077 
 2 -1.984 2.010 -1.991 2.015 -1.759 2.077 
 3 -0.993 2.010 -1.002 2.015 -0.784 2.077 
 4  0.941 2.010  0.933 2.015  1.130 2.077 
      
Random effects 
Intercept  0.219*** 0.073  0.218*** 0.072  0.327*** 0.078 
Political interest  0.014*** 0.005  0.013*** 0.005  0.010** 0.004 
Voted Government  0.242*** 0.076  0.244*** 0.076   
       
Level-1 N 30,683 30,683 30,683 
Level-2 N        23        23        23 
Note: High values on the dependent indicate rightist attitudes toward redistribution. SCALE OF INCOMES ranges 
from 1–12, RELIGIOSITY from 0–22, LIFE SATISFACTION from 0–20, and INSTITUTIONAL TRUST from 0–30. 
WOMAN, HIGHER EDUCATION, and POLITICAL INTEREST are dummy variables. High values on lnECONOMY
indicate that the government holds rightist economic views. Levels of statistical significance are indicated by 
asterisks: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1%. The probability values are 
calculated using a two-tailed test. 
The second hypothesis – A person belonging to the upper socio-economic strata holds 
rightist views on income redistribution – is confirmed in all three models. The income proxy – 
SCALE OF INCOMES – is positive and significant, and it is also the most robust determinant of 
economic left–right attitudes. Further backing the self-interest argument, HIGHER EDUCATION
is also positive and significant in all models. I argued that self-interest is an important 
component of education, expecting this variable to be positively associated with conservative 
economic opinions.
 The third hypothesis – The rightist effect of education on economic left–right opinions 
is smaller in countries where the political elite are negative towards redistributive policies – 
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is also confirmed. This becomes apparent in models 2 and 3, which show a negative and 
significant interaction effect of education and party manifestos. One must, however, bear in 
mind that the effect of lnECONOMY is not significant (neither positive nor negative) for 
persons with higher education.12 It is, in fact, the rightist effect of education (which is a level-
1 effect) that is significantly lower (yet still rightist) for highly educated persons that live in 
economically conservative regimes. This finding is in line with the reasoning that those with 
higher levels of education are better equipped to filter political information (Eveland and 
Scheufele, 2000; Liu and Eveland, 2005) and that another factor associated with education 
plays an important part, namely that of critical thinking (Giroux, 1983a,b; Fairbrother, 2003). 
 I also control for other characteristics that influence people’s economic left–right 
opinions. Women and older generations are, as expected, more in favor of redistributive 
policies than men and younger generations respectively. Persons with high scores on LIFE 
SATISFACTION and INSTITUTIONAL TRUST hold more rightist opinions than their less satisfied 
and less trusting counterparts. The effects of political interest and whether or not one voted 
for one of the incumbent parties vary depending on country of residence. The interaction term 
composed of VOTED GOVERNMENT and lnECONOMY, which was introduced in model 3, 
shows that the governing parties’ followers are very much in line with their respective parties’ 
policy statements. Individuals who voted for economically conservative incumbents are 
significantly more rightist than those who voted for more economically leftist incumbents. 
Discussion 
In this paper I have introduced party programs as a measure of elite influence on mass 
opinion. This variable was constructed using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project. 
The central finding of this article is the dual effect of higher education on public opinion. My 
aim has been to contribute to elite-public opinion research by carrying out a cross-national 
investigation spanning 23 European countries, employing multilevel ordered logit modelling. 
Three hypotheses were tested, the first pertaining to the direct influence of the political elite 
on mass opinion. This is based on the concepts of conformity and identification, as well as 
literature on the bandwagon effect. Testing the robustness of the self-interest argument, the 
second hypothesis also functions as a lead-up to the third and final question: whether or not 
12 The coefficient of HIGHER EDUCATION only captures the effect of this variable on INCOME DISTRIBUTION when 
lnECONOMY is zero, just as the coefficient of lnECONOMY only captures its effect on the dependent variable when 
HIGHER EDUCATION is zero. By switching reference category on HIGHER EDUCATION, I found the effect of policy 
on higher educated people to be slightly negative (as can be read from models 2 and 3) and not significant. 
18
there is any cross-level interaction effect between policy-elite opinion and education, my 
argument being that education is not only a measure of self-interest. It also includes a critical 
thinking component which would reduce the rightist effect of higher education in countries 
where policy elites are economically conservative. 
 Summarizing the results, this study has shown that there is little direct effect of 
incumbent party preferences on public opinion toward redistribution. Although a positive 
tendency is discernible, its effect is not statistically significant. This non-finding is in 
accordance with parts of the literature (e.g., Butler, 1996). There is no evidence for either the 
bandwagon or the underdog effect, after controlling for whether or not the respondent has 
voted for an incumbent party. Much of the explanation for this is attributed to the highly 
relevant VOTED GOVERNMENT control, which can be said to function as a moderator variable. 
It was included in the analysis based on the argument that economic opinions influence the 
vote. Unsurprisingly, the models show that those who voted for the incumbents agree with 
their policy statements. The self-interest argument stands out as the most robust finding of this 
paper: people belonging to the upper socio-economic strata are generally more opposed to 
redistribution than low-income people. This finding is in line with most empirical literature on 
redistributive opinions. Both INCOME and HIGHER EDUCATION are strong positive predictors 
of rightist attitudes. 
 Last, the novel theoretical argument of this paper was the proposed mixed effects of 
the two components of education. Higher education, I argue, is not only a measure of self-
interest, but also includes a portion of critical thinking. Education increases critical thinking 
which again can lead to reaction and resistance against hegemonic opinions. As expected, 
education was associated with conservative economic views. Yet, by introducing a cross-level 
interaction term, I tested my third hypothesis: the rightist effect of education on economic 
left–right opinions is smaller in countries where the political elites are negative toward 
redistributive policies. Models 2 and 3 supported this. I attribute this finding partly to the 
critical thinking argument. In addition, the reasoning that higher education makes people 
better able to filter political information should also work as a counter force to the bandwagon 
effect. 
 This study investigates the link between political elites and the public, without finding 
evidence of a direct link between the opinions of these groups. The new contribution to the 
literature is primarily the conditional effect between the political elite views and schooling. 
Education, I argue, is of a twofold nature, an argument that is supported by the results from 
the present analysis. It may seem, as was the intention of Habermas and others, that education 
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actually does promote critical thinking with regard to the economic left–right orientations of 
the public. The ruling political elite may play a part in influencing its citizens, yet the 
evidence presented here does not support this claim. There is a bivariate effect, however, but 
this can be explained largely by partisan bias. I believe it is of importance for both political 
science in general, and the study of public opinion in particular, to address questions 
pertaining to the link between macro factors and micro level attitudes. In this paper I have 
showed that there is interplay between the policies of governing parties and education. Some 
caveats concerning this study nonetheless deserve mentioning, first and foremost the problem 
of endogeneity and the nature of the party manifesto variable. Even so, I hope that this paper 
has contributed to shed some new light on the elite-public link. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Variables included in the ECONOMY measure
Economic Position: Per401 Free enterprise: Positive – Per403 Market Regulation: Positive – 
Per404 Economic Planning: Positive – Per412 Controlled Economy: Positive + Per414 
Economic Orthodoxy: Positive + Per4011 Privatization: Positive + Per4012 Control of 
Economy: Negative – Per4132 Privatization: Negative 
Appendix B. Sensitivity analysis: model with INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1-5) as dependent, 
random slope 
(1) (2) (3) 
b Std. E. b Std. E. b Std. E. 
Intercept  4.001*** 0.963  4.001*** 0.962  3.913*** 0.965 
      
Level-1 variables       
Woman -0.140*** 0.011 -0.140*** 0.011 -0.140*** 0.002 
Age -0.014*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 
Age squared 0.0001*** 0.000 0.0001*** 0.000 0.0001*** 0.000 
Scale of incomes  0.054*** 0.003  0.054*** 0.003  0.054*** 0.003 
Higher education  0.351*** 0.034  0.351*** 0.034  0.355*** 0.034 
Life satisfaction  0.020*** 0.002  0.020*** 0.002  0.020*** 0.002 
Institutional trust  0.009*** 0.001  0.009*** 0.001  0.009*** 0.001 
Political interest  -0.005 0.014 -0.005 0.014 -0.005 0.014 
Voted Government  0.121** 0.056  0.121** 0.056 -0.139 0.108 
      
Cross-level interaction       
High Edu.*Economy   -0.084*** 0.018 -0.086 0.018 
Vot. Gov.*Economy     0.141** 0.056 
      
Level-2 variables       
lnEconomy -0.005 0.065 -0.007 0.064  0.037 0.067 
HDI 2003 -2.406** 1.064 -2.403** 1.063 -2.392** 1.067 
      
Random effects 
Level-1 residual  0.937*** 0.008  0.936*** 0.008  0.936*** 0.008 
Intercept  0.054*** 0.019  0.054*** 0.019  0.053*** 0.018 
Political interest  0.003*** 0.001  0.003*** 0.001  0.003*** 0.001 
Voted Government   0.067*** 0.021  0.068*** 0.021  0.052*** 0.016 
      
Level-1 N 30,683 30,683 30,683 
Level-2 N        23        23         23 
-2 Log Likelihood 85,271.106 85,250.237 85,243.860 
Note: Units are weighted to achieve equal N for each country. High values on the dependent indicate rightist 
attitudes toward redistribution. SCALE OF INCOMES ranges from 1-12, RELIGIOSITY from 0-22, LIFE SATISFACTION
from 0-20, and INSTITUTIONAL TRUST from 0-30. WOMAN, HIGHER EDUCATION, and POLITICAL INTEREST are 
dummy variables. The level-2 variable ECONOMY is log transformed. High values indicate that the government 
holds rightist economic views. Levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1%. The probability values are calculated using a two-tailed 
test. 
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Appendix C. Tolerance values for the explanatory variables 
Variables Tolerance 
Woman 0.940 
Age 0.035 
Age squared 0.034 
Scale of incomes 0.441 
Higher education 0.880 
Life satisfaction 0.735 
Institutional trust 0.763 
Political interest 0.829 
Voted government 0.946 
Economy 0.945 
HDI 2003 0.473 
Appendix D. Descriptive statistics for individual level variables
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
INCOME DIFFERENCE (1-5) 44,388 2.170 1.048 0.803 -0.033 
WOMAN (0-1) 45,464 0.534 - - - 
AGE 45,355 45.196 18.211 0.214 -0.836 
SCALE OF INCOMES (1-12) 33,171 6.04 2.793 0.003 -0.957 
HIGHER EDUCATION (0-1) 45,121 0.193 - - - 
LIFE SATISFACTION (0-20) 45,143 14.283 3.939 -0.878 0.609 
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST (0-30) 42,959 14.776 6.281 -0.265 -0.498 
POLITICAL INTEREST (0-1) 45,429 0.453 - - - 
VOTED GOVERNMENT (0-1) 45,587 0,274 - - - 
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Appendix E. Principal component analysis from the European Social Survey (2004-data), 
using varimax rotation 
Trust in 
Instit.
Immig 
-ration 
Relig-
ion
Trust in 
Individ. 
Life
Satisf. 
Political 
Interest 
Public-  
Private
Trust in politicians .842       
Trust in polit. parties .827       
Trust in parliament .803       
Trust in legal system .731       
Satisfied with govern. .718       
Satisfied with democr. .683       
Trust in the police .631       
Satisfied with econom. .587     
Trust in the U.N. .560     
State of health service .529     
State of education .513     
Immigration dif. race .866      
Immig. poor countries .831      
Immig. same race .776      
Immig. worse/better  .737      
Immig. cultural life  .709      
Immig. economy  .707      
How often pray   .874     
How religious are you   .847     
Religious attendance   .846     
Gays live as they wish .356     
People advantage/fair    .769    
People helpful/selfish    .743    
People trusted/careful    .722    
How happy are you     .815   
Satisfied with life     .802   
Make up polit. opinion      .783 
Politics complicated      .763 
Interest in politics      .688 
Reduce income. diff.       .719
Placement on l-r scale       .689
Cronbach’s Alpha .798 .839 .889 .768 .827 .681 
Note: All factor loadings less than .40 are suppressed. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy is .893. Units are weighted to achieve equal N for each country. Chronbach’s Alpha values for 
variables who’s factor loadings are in bald.  IMMIGRATION WORSE/BETTER, IMMIGRATION CULTURAL LIFE, 
IMMIGRATION ECONOMY, and MAKE UP POLITICAL OPINION have been turned to correspond with the other 
variables. 
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